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Introduction
This thesis consists of three parts on current banking issues. The topic of
banking regulation is the common objective in all three articles. I analyze
liquidity and capital requirements as well as deposit insurance. The following
aspects are considered: liquidity and banking system stability, computation
of deposit insurance premiums for systemic relevant banks and comparison
of the different regulatory measures when banks’ home countries find them-
selves confronted with locational competition. In the following, I introduce
the three research questions and present the results.
The first paper provides a novel measure to ascertain banking system stabil-
ity with respect to market liquidity risk. Market liquidity risk characterizes
the potential loss of selling an asset because it can only be traded at high
costs. I measure system stability of a given number of financially interlinked
banks via the capability to absorb downward spiraling illiquid asset prices. I
focus on times of financial distress when banks have to rebalance their capital
asset ratios because of losses on the asset side and when it is expensive to
raise equity. Thus, banks can obtain funding from selling illiquid assets on
the market and not from increasing the liability side of the balance sheet.
Downward spiraling asset prices are generated by the following mechanism:
price shocks induce an increased supply of the illiquid assets and vice versa.
Hence, in my model, systemic risk is primarily induced by the collapse of the
market. Using fixed-point iterations, I compute the new equilibrium price of
the illiquid asset after initial shocks and identify stable and unstable areas
with regard to price declines. This allows us to define the stability measure
with respect to market liquidity risk which has a clear economic interpreta-
tion: it quantifies the maximal proportional price shock a system can bear
without suffering a reduction in the equilibrium price of the illiquid asset. It
is unique for fixed market conditions and I provide a computable formulation
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of the measure.
The analysis of the stability measure shows that the growth of liquid as-
sets and ex ante strengthened capital standards improve system stability.
However, if stronger capital standards are imposed during the crisis when
illiquid asset prices decline, system stability is reduced because of the hereby
increased sales of assets. Moreover, I find that the financial stability of the en-
tire banking system may deteriorate if we increase the amount of the illiquid
assets held by banks. At first sight, this result is surprising since the growth
of the illiquid assets reduces the default risk and augments the capital asset
ratio for single banks. However, from the viewpoint of systemic stability,
the result is reasonable: the banks in the system depend on the market for
illiquid assets and therefore it is not sufficient to consider only single banks.
I calibrate the model to the Austrian banking system. The stability measure
proves to have a long-term forecast power in this case because the empirical
analysis of the years 2006 until 2008 shows financial instability throughout
the entire period, i.e., also before the public became aware of the crisis.
The second paper is a joint work with Matthias Ju¨ttner. We concentrate
on statutory liability insurance for the entire debt of a bank, especially of a
‘too big to fail’ bank. The idea is to impose a premium for deposit insurance
by the government on systemic relevant banks such that the banks have to
pay for the state guarantee accordingly to the size of their liabilities and their
risk exposures. In case of default, only the depositors or lenders to the bank
are bailed out and not the shareholders who decide upon an institution’s
risk policy. The implicit state guarantee for systemic relevant banks then no
longer exists and it switches into an explicit guarantee. This regulatory ap-
proach solves the market discipline issue with regard to excessive risk-taking
since shareholders will not be rescued in threatening situations, and reduces
contagion effects within the financial system since deposits will be similar
to safe bonds supported by the government. Drawbacks of the method are
moral hazard and the procyclicality of the premiums. The latter makes a
potential implementation of statutory deposit insurance difficult. However,
the method enables us to calculate rough estimates for the costs of liability
10
insurance for ‘too big to fail’ banks over the last years.
We compute the guarantee values for the liability side of UBS and CS in a
dynamic setup from 2004 until 2009 in quarterly steps as if the guarantee
had been explicit. The guarantee values, the value at risk and the expected
shortfalls are provided for time horizons of one and five years, i.e., we as-
sume that debt has a maturity of one or five years, respectively, and that
the deposit insurance will last during this time period. The model is based
on the option pricing theory. As expected, we find zero premiums for 2004
and 2005. The current financial crisis became apparent in the beginning of
2007 both in reality and in our results which indicate increasing premiums
in 2006 and especially in 2007. As of 2008, the high levels of the guarantee
value are up to 22 bn CHF for CS and 13 bn for UBS in the scenario with
a time horizon of one year. Besides this benchmark scenario, we calculate
different cases including jumps in the asset paths of the banks or various
volatility specifications. The sensitivity analysis with respect to regulatory
relevant measures yields a reduction of the guarantee value with respect to
tighter capital rules and higher number of audits.
The third paper starts with an international perspective. In a sequential
game, I analyze the regulation of multinationals by countries which are un-
der the influence of locational competition and lobbying. Hence, countries
face the dilemma that they have to regulate the firms on the one hand and
on the other, they also want to attract and retain them for tax and labor
supply reasons. Lobbying means that governments are biased such that they
maximize profits of the firms in addition to their own utility functions. In
the game, countries decide upon their regulatory policies by anticipating the
behavior of the firms. I find that the best outcome for countries’ aggregate
benefit is global regulation. However, no regulation is the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and the strictly dominant strategy of the
countries when we allow for lobbying. I.e., no country can benefit by chang-
ing from no regulation to optimal regulation if the other countries maintain
their no regulation strategies. Furthermore, countries even always obtain a
better outcome when choosing no regulation instead of optimal regulation, no
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matter what the other countries choose. Country-specifc regulatory schemes
of different levels of rigor are not optimal for countries in my setup since they
turn out to be unstable and may lead to suboptimal equilibria because of lo-
cational competition. If countries take part in tax competition, the unique
SPNE is no regulation with overall low taxes and this represents also the
weakly dominant strategy of the countries.
My model is applicable to generic multinational firms which can relocate
headquarters or relevant parts to other countries. However, I also consider
the concrete case of banking regulation. The application of the game to
banks allows to compare statutory deposit insurance with tighter capital and
liquidity rules in a global setup. The implementation of deposit insurance
puts an end to the implicit state guarantee for systemic relevant banks and
decreases banks’ profits by the loss of favorable refinancing costs. On the
other hand, more severe capital standards and liquidity measures reduce,
but do not solve the problem of the government bailout. Moreover, they di-
rectly restrict banks’ business activities, which also decreases banks’ profits.
I identify situations for which deposit insurance induces higher payoffs for
the countries under global regulation. Additionally, deposit insurance proves
to have a disciplinary effect on banks’ risk-taking.
The main findings of the thesis are: first, I present a novel stability mea-
sure for banking systems, which indicates the illiquid price shock a banking
system can resist without incurring a lower illiquid equilibrium price. Second,
the positive impact of tighter liquidity and stronger ex ante capital rules on
banking system stability is supported by both the investigation with regard
to market liquidity risk and the sensitivity analysis of the deposit insurance
premiums. Third, we provide concrete numbers which indicate how the guar-
antee values of Credit Suisse and UBS could have been approximated in the
last years if their implicit guarantee had been explicit. Fourth, I point out
that locational competition and lobbying can both have unfavorable effects
on optimal regulation of multinationals. The model suggests an international
approach to regulation since otherwise insufficient regulatory schemes may be
anticipated. In other words, my game-theoretic model predicts that, without
12
the enforcement of global rules, individual interests of single countries may
prevent optimal regulation.
13
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the financial stability of banking systems with respect to market
liquidity risk. I quantify the maximal proportional price shock a
banking system can sustain without downward spiraling illiquid
asset prices. It follows that an absolute and a percentage growth
of liquid assets improve and more severe capital requirements in
times of financial distress reduce banking system stability. The ex
ante establishment of stronger capital standards, which enables
banks to adapt their capital structure in prosperous periods, in-
creases stability. The model is calibrated to the Austrian banking
system. The empirical analysis shows financial instability already
in 2006, i.e., the stability measure proves to have a long-term fore-
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1 Introduction
How do we measure the stability of a banking system with regard to price
declines of illiquid assets? This paper gives an answer by defining and explor-
ing the stability measure with respect to market liquidity risk. It indicates
the illiquid price shock a banking system can resist without incurring a lower
illiquid equilibrium price. Hence, the new feature of my analysis is that I
suggest an instrument which quantifies system stability. More severe capital
requirements are publicly discussed after the recent crisis and are an impor-
tant regulatory instrument to downsize the default risk of banks. I prove
the stabilizing effect of stronger capital standards if they are established in
prosperous periods when banks are able to raise equity. However, without
stronger liquidity standards, the gained solvency may melt down immediately
when illiquid asset prices collapse and therefore reduce the market value of
the asset side. From the viewpoint of market liquidity risk, my system stabil-
ity analysis also emphasizes the vital importance of liquidity in general and
of the growth of liquid assets in banks’ balance sheets as a concrete measure.
In order to clarify the essential terms ab initio, I will first provide the meaning
of market liquidity risk. It characterizes the potential loss of selling an asset
because it can only be traded at high or prohibitive costs and is explained,
for example, in Kaserer and Stange (2009). Market liquidity is crucial for the
banks in my model since they need to sell assets in order to satisfy capital
requirements. Because I focus on times of financial distress, it is too costly
for banks to increase their liability side and asset sales are the only possibility
to rebalance the capital asset ratio. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) state
the mutual reinforcing of funding and market liquidity risk, which applies to
my model: the funding of the bank depends on the asset’s market liquidity.
In order to investigate the subjects of financial stability, market liquidity
risk and systemic risk, I present a model of banking systems with financial
interconnections, prudential regulation and financial institutions that mark
their assets to market based on the framework by Cifuentes et al. (2005).
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When assets are marked to market in a system of mutually dependent banks,
regulatory capital requirements can induce forced sales of illiquid assets in
times of market turbulence. Even a small initial illiquid price shock reduces
the market value of a firm’s balance sheet which can generate a downward spi-
raling of the illiquid asset price via the constraints. This mechanism suggests
that systemic risk in networks is market liquidity risk and not only credit
risk which is caused by balance sheet interlinkage among banks. Contrary to
the model of Cifuentes et al. (2005), the future demand of the illiquid asset
is not determined by a specific function. It only has to fulfill a short list of
weak assumptions and is stochastic. Thus, my setup allows for more gen-
eral market conditions. Using a fixed-point iteration, I distinguish regions
of illiquid asset prices after the initial shock which lead to either lower or
higher future equilibrium prices. As a consequence of this characterization of
stable and unstable areas with regard to price declines, my model suggests
the definition of the stability measure with respect to market liquidity risk
which has a clear economic interpretation: it quantifies the maximal propor-
tional price shock that a system can bear without suffering a reduction in
the equilibrium price of the illiquid asset. Hence, it measures the resilience
of a banking system with respect to downward spiraling illiquid asset prices.
I construct a stability measure which is unique for fixed market conditions,
easily computable and admits a precise mathematical formulation.
As pointed out by Cifuentes et al. (2005), investment banks, hedge funds
or insurance companies hold mainly marketable assets. For these financial
firms the above explanation of contagious failures is relevant. However, even
commercial banks hold some financial assets on their trading book that are
marked to market. Therefore, the theoretical investigation of mark-to-market
rules combined with prudential regulations as a possible source of financial
crises is important for many financial institutions.
Which properties are fulfilled by the stability measure? My theoretical anal-
ysis shows that an absolute as well as a percentage growth of liquid assets
improves banking system stability with respect to market liquidity risk. A
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reduction of system stability is proved for an increasing lower bound on the
capital asset ratio in times of financial distress and an increase of stability
is verified if the capital standards are strengthened ex ante. The discussion
of optimal regulatory measures goes beyond the scope of the investigation
of liquidity and capital requirements with respect to market liquidity risk in
this paper. However, the model suggests the establishment of higher capital
requirements in times which permit the raise of equity and ideally combined
with severe liquidity standards in order to absorb increased market liquid-
ity risk. Although this policy, especially with regard to stronger liquidity
standards, improves system stability in turbulent times from the viewpoint
of market liquidity risk and may narrow abundant loan approval in booming
periods, it may reduce profitability in prosperous times and increase infla-
tion risk exposure of the bank. Adverse effects of increased liquidity - and
thereby enhanced resilience - on stability via excessive risk-taking due to the
incentives induced by limited liability are discussed in Wagner (2007). Fur-
thermore, I find that the financial stability of the entire banking system may
deteriorate if I increase the amount of the illiquid assets held by banks - al-
though the default risk decreases and the capital asset ratio grows for single
banks. This result emphasizes the importance of exploring system stability.
Since many banks in the system depend on the same market, it is not suffi-
cient to analyze single banks.
Does the stability measure provide forecast power if performed on empiri-
cal data? I apply the stability measure on Austrian banking system data
from the first quarter of the year 2006 until the end of 2008 in order to
illustrate its functionality and to show its accuracy of capturing financial
stability. The result proves a long-term forecast power of the measure in this
case since I find financial instability of the banking system already in 2006.
The stability measure indicates future illiquid equilibrium prices between 86
and 94% of today’s price after small price shocks. Hence, the model does
not suggest price evaporations. Doubling the amount of liquid assets in the
entire Austrian banking system results in full stability with respect to market
liquidity risk.
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My application depends on the interbank liability matrix which is difficult
to access. I investigate the financial stability of the Austrian banking system
because Boss et al. (2004) managed to obtain the Austrian interbank liabil-
ity data set from Central Bank data using structural features of the balance
sheet data base (MAUS) and the major loan register (GKE) in combination
with an estimation technique. An exploration of the network topology with
respect to interbank liabilities can be found in their empirical analysis of the
Austrian interbank market. They kindly provide us their interbank data.
Although my stability measure constitutes an original concept, let me em-
bed my paper into the existing literature and point out my contribution.
In accordance with the characterization of the state of the art in Estrada
and Osorio (2006), the literature on the topic of systemic risk in financial
systems can be classified in three groups. First, the traditional bank run
models involve only a single bank. The second group considers contagion in
multiple bank systems. The failure of a small number of banks is transferred
to others due to financial linkages across institutions. For example, Wells
(2002) and Cifuentes (2003) are exponents of the second branch of litera-
ture. Their investigations of the interbank credit exposures are similar to my
approach and the one by Cifuentes et al. (2005). However, I do not only
focus on contagion effects, but I include the market for illiquid assets in my
analysis of system stability. The third group assumes that the distress of a
small number of banks spreads to other banks through the disruption of the
market. Distressed banks can perturb the markets and this disruption alters
the value of the positions of every bank in the system. For instance, Allen
and Gale (2003) contribute to the third branch. Cifuentes et al. (2005),
Estrada and Osorio (2006) and my paper add to the second and the third
group of literature. As in my approach, Estrada and Osorio (2006) explain
the transformation of liquidity risk into market risk via liquidation of assets
by banks in order to cover their obligations and via downward spiraling as-
set prices because of not perfectly elastic demand as well as mark-to-market
accounting. The innovation of my paper is the suggestion of the stability
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measure which allows to quantify the systemic risk. An exhaustive survey
of systemic risk is presented in De Bandt and Hartmann (2000). However,
as mentioned above, my work also contributes to the topic of liquidity risk
and market liquidity risk and is therefore related to Allen and Gale (2004),
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Adrian and Shin (2010), which investigate
the task of liquidity in asset pricing.
The organization of the paper is as follows: section 2 provides the frame-
work. Section 3 establishes the market liquidity risk measure and section 4
executes the system stability analysis. In section 5, I conduct an application
on the Austrian banking system. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model setup
I consider a system of n interlinked banks and discuss the realistic case of
interbank claims of equal seniority. To be as general as possible, I do not
require the system to be closed, i.e., other banks and financial connections
to these institutions can exist outside the system. Let x¯i denote the total
liabilities of bank i ∈ {1, ..., n} due to others. The yi are liabilities of bank
i to institutions outside the system and the zi its payments received from
outside. If Lij is the liability of bank i to bank j, then x¯i =
∑n
j=1 Lij + yi. I
assume that ei denotes bank i’s endowment of the illiquid, ci the amount of
the liquid asset and p is the price of the illiquid asset. The price of the liquid
asset is always equal to one. The market value of bank i’s liability is defined
as
xi = min
{
x¯i, ci + pei + zi +
n∑
j=1
Lji
}
.
I assume that banks are always reimbursed for loans lent to other banks
because of the following reasoning. First, it seems to be the most realistic
case in times of widely-used repurchase agreements, shortest term loans in
the overnight market, governmental interventions in the financial sector and
state guarantees for large and interconnected banks. For instance, repos and
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shortest term loans lead to instantaneously adjusting and very flexible in-
terbank networks which can in turn reduce counterparty risk exposures. At
least, it is the appropriate case for my application on the Austrian banking
system during the current crisis. Second, contagion is reduced and I am able
to focus on financial stability with respect to market liquidity risk, i.e., the
potential collapse of the banking system is induced by the falling market
prices of the illiquid asset. However, it is possible to extend my model to
the full contagion case as described in Cifuentes et al. (2005).34 Banks are
assumed to be passive and are not allowed to take investment decisions. My
focus on times of financial distress when banks have to liquidate their illiquid
assets legitimizes this assumption of taking asset allocations as given.
The equity value of bank i (mark-to-market accounting) is the sum of the
market values of its liquid assets ci, its illiquid assets pei, the payments from
outside the system zi and the total payment received from all other banks∑n
j=1 Lji reduced by the market value of its liabilities xi :
ci + pei + zi +
n∑
j=1
Lji − xi ≥ 0.
Priority of debt over equity implies that the equity value of bank i is strictly
positive only if bank i’s payment to the other banks is equal to its notional
obligation. In order to formally describe a banking system and to facilitate
precise formulations of my results, I use the following notation:
3The existence and uniqueness proofs of equilibria then require additional conditions
according to Eisenberg and Noe (2001) which reduce the generality of my work.
4An analysis of the Austrian banking system including contagion can be found in
Elsinger et al. (2006).
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M˜(n+3)×n∗ denotes the space of (n+ 3)× (n+ 1) matrices of the form
L11 = 0 · · · L1n y1
...
. . .
...
...
Ln1 · · · Lnn = 0 yn
z1 · · · zn 0
e1 · · · en 0
c1 · · · cn 0

with elements greater than or equal to zero.
A matrix S ∈ M˜(n+3)×n∗ represents a banking system consisting of n banks.
The Lij, ei, ci, yi and zi have the same meaning as before. The specific
arrangement of the elements in the matrix allows to observe the notional
obligation of bank i as the sum of the ith row and bank j’s assets as the
appropriately weighted sum of the jth column for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n :
L11 = 0 · · · j · · · L1n y1
...
. . .
...
...
i
...
. . .
...
...
Ln1 · · · · · · Lnn = 0 yn
z1 · · · · · · zn 0
e1 · · · · · · en 0
c1 · · · · · · cn 0

∑
k
Lik + yi = x¯i
pej + cj + zj +
∑
k
Lkj
The exact definitions of systems, subsystems and subtleties like equivalence of
systems are provided in the appendix (definitions 6 and 7). For the moment,
let us consider one concrete system. At the beginning, the equilibrium price
of the illiquid asset is p0 = 1. I assume that the banking system suffers a
negative illiquid price shock from p0 to the lower price p1. This price jump
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reduces the market value of a bank’s illiquid asset and the bank might find
itself satisfying the capital adequacy constraint
r∗ ≤ ci + p1ei + zi +
∑n
j=1 Lji − xi
(ci − ti) + p1(ei − si) + zi +
∑n
j=1 Lji
only after the sale of ti units of the liquid and the sale of si units of the illiquid
asset. The capital asset ratio is defined as equity value over market value of
total assets. I assume that a bank has to fulfill this capital requirement as
long as it holds some liquid or illiquid assets. In accordance with Cifuentes et
al. (2005), I assume that the assets are sold for cash which does not attract a
capital requirement. The value of r∗ is assumed to be given and it constitutes
the lower bound on the capital asset ratio of bank i, for each i. For instance,
the value of r∗ is 8% with respect to minimum capital requirement ratios
in Basel II regulations. In case of violating the constraint, bank i must sell
some of its assets in order to satisfy the condition.5 The bank sells all its
liquid assets before it starts selling its illiquid assets6 and it cannot short sell
the assets. I derive the supply functions si(p1) of the illiquid asset and ti(p1)
of the liquid asset for each bank i using the capital adequacy ratio:
si(p) =

0 , vi ≤ 0
ei , vi ≥ ei
vi , otherwise
where
vi(p) =
xi − (1− r∗)(
∑n
j=1 Lji + pei + zi)− ci + r∗(ci − ti(p))
r∗p
,
ti(p) =

0 , t˜i ≤ 0
ci , t˜i ≥ ci
t˜i , otherwise
5I follow Cifuentes et al. (2005) and assume that banks cannot raise equity since it is
expensive and time-consuming in case of distress.
6As pointed out by Cifuentes et al. (2005), this is not a strong assumption since any
value maximizing bank will follow this rule.
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and
t˜i(p) =
xi − (1− r∗)(
∑n
j=1 Lji + pei + ci + zi)
r∗
.
Bank i has to sell the amount si(p1) of the illiquid asset if the initial shock
leads to the price p1. Hence, si(p1) is zero as long as bank i can sell liquid
assets (ti(p1) < ci). When all the liquid assets are sold, the supply of the
illiquid asset starts to grow until ei is reached. The total sales of the illiquid
asset generated by the entire banking system multiplied with parameter β
are s(p1) = β
∑n
i=1 si(p1). We need the parameter β in order to calibrate
the supply curve. Different β allow us to compare systems with different
currencies: system stability must not change if we use the same data in euro
instead of dollar. Note that the si(p) and s(p) are continuous and monoton-
ically decreasing in p.
The future demand curve for the illiquid asset7 is assumed to be
dx(p1) = d(p1) + x, x ∼ F
where d is a demand curve and F an absolutely continuous cumulative distri-
bution function with density function f fitting the following requirements:8
• The demand function d : R+ → R is monotonically decreasing, bijective
and satisfies the following three assumptions:
1. limp→0 d(p) = +∞,
7Note that the future demand curve may also reflect the new information-sensitivity
of the illiquid assets after the shock as explained in Gorton and Metrick (2010). The
stochastic demand intends to incorporate the mispricing risk with respect to the illiquid
assets as observed in the current crisis for a variety of financial assets and discussed in, for
instance, Easley and O’Hara (2010). However, there are always trades and prices in my
model since banks need to sell their illiquid assets.
8This setup allows to define the appropriate expected future price curve E[p2|p] =∫
d−1x (s(p))f(x)dx according to the probability distribution of the future demand later on.
Indeed, we will find that E[p2|p] is a deterministic function of p since integration absorbs
the stochastic of the demand. However, it is also possible to use directly the definition
E[p2|p] = d−1(s(p)) if one assumes that the future demand is known. In this case, it
is necessary to generalize the notation because one uses the Dirac δ measure instead of
density function and Lebesgue measure. The theoretical results remain the same.
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2. limp→∞ d(p) = −∞,
3. d(1) = 0.
• d and f have to ensure that ∫∞−∞ d−1x (z)f(x)dx exists for all z ∈ range(s)
and that the integral is continuous in z.
Note that d is continuous and d−1 exists. Assumption 1 requires that the
demand has to be infinite if the price is zero. Assumption 2 ensures that we
observe well-defined finite future prices d−1x (s(p)) for all x ∈ R. Assumption
3 is a normalization. Note that E[p2|p] :=
∫
d−1x (s(p))f(x)dx ≥ 0 since
d−1x (z) ≥ 0 ∀z ∈ range(s) and f ≥ 0. Additionally, E[p2|p] is monotonically
increasing in p. The proof can be found in the appendix.
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d0.08-1(s(p1))
Figure 1. Supply and future demand curves
Figure 1 shows the supply and three concrete demand curves for x = −0.2,
0.0 and 0.08. The future price of the illiquid asset will be p2 = d
−1
x (s(p1)).
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If x = 0.08, the future price equals d−10.08(s(p1)) as illustrated in figure 1.
However, x is unknown at this moment. Therefore, we have to use the
expectation with respect to the distribution F : the expected future price p2
conditional on today’s price p1 after the initial shock reads as
E[p2|p1].
If the expected future price E[p2|p1] is lower than p1, the capital adequacy
constraint may induce further sales of the illiquid asset. Thus, banks expect a
further price depression. This process is reiterated until the next equilibrium
price pˆ is reached. Financial institutions use p1 as the starting value and
compute the solution to the fixed-point equation
pˆ = E[p2|pˆ]
via iteration in order to anticipate the next equilibrium price pˆ. A downward
spiral in asset prices occurs if the anticipated equilibrium price pˆ is lower
than the expected future price E[p2|p1] after the initial shock and therefore
more illiquid assets are on sale than required after the initial shock.
Since
E[p2|p] =
∫
d−1x (s(p))f(x)dx
=
∫
d−1(s(p)− x)f(x)dx
= (d−1 ∗ f) ◦ s(p),
the fixed-point equation pˆ = (d−1∗f)◦s(pˆ) only depends on d, f and s. Recall
that s is determined by the parameters of the system S. Hence, it is sufficient
to know d, f and S in order to compute the next illiquid equilibrium price
after the initial shock. This fact motivates the following definition:
Definition 1 Suppose that d is a demand and f is a density function sat-
isfying the above assumptions and S ∈ M˜(n+3)×n∗ for any natural number n.
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Assume that the n banks in the system compute the next equilibrium price af-
ter an initial illiquid price shock as described above. Then, the triple (d, f, S)
is called an economy. The pair (d, f) are the market conditions.
3 Market liquidity risk measure
Using the definitions and notations provided in the previous section, I estab-
lish the market liquidity risk measure. The proofs of the propositions stated
in this section are given in the appendix.
 E[ p2 | p ]
   1
E[ p2 | p ] > p
E[ p2 | p ] < p
   ^  ~   p0=1 ^        p
   plow  p    phigh
Figure 2. Definition of market liquidity risk measure p˜
In figure 2, I plot the diagonal y = p and the expected future price E[p2|p]
as a function of p. Proposition 1 explains the number p˜ in figure 2.
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Proposition 1 Let (d, f, S) be an economy. I suppose that the equilibrium
price at the beginning is p0 = 1 and observe an initial price shock from p0 to
the strictly lower price p1. There exists a price p˜ ∈ [0, 1] such that
• all price shocks leading to prices p1 ≤ p˜ induce a next equilibrium price
smaller than or equal to p˜ and
• all price shocks leading to prices p1 > p˜ imply an upward movement of
prices resulting in a strictly higher equilibrium price than p1.
In some cases, there are two possible candidates for p˜ ∈ [0, 1] and we choose
the unique p˜ ∈ [0, 1).
Definition 2 The unique p˜ described in proposition 1 is called market liq-
uidity risk measure.
A high p˜ indicates a high market liquidity risk. The quantity 1 − p˜ is a
measure for the stability of the system with respect to negative price shocks
and market liquidity risk. The greater 1 − p˜, the more can the system bear
larger shocks. This fact motivates the following definition:
Definition 3 Let (d, f, S) be an economy and p˜ the unique market liquidity
risk measure. m˜ := 1 − p˜ is called stability measure with respect to market
liquidity risk.
Note that m˜ expresses the supremum of the proportional illiquid price shocks
for which the fixed-point iteration reestablishes p0 or an even higher number
as the next equilibrium price. For all proportional initial price shocks larger
than or equal to m˜, the next equilibrium price will be smaller than or equal
to p˜.
Proposition 1 is stated in non-technical terms. Proposition 10 formulates
the precise definition of the market liquidity risk measure and it is presented
in the appendix.
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4 System stability analysis
I want to formulate some important properties of the market liquidity risk
measure p˜. In this section, we investigate the impact of changes in system
parameters on the measure. For a fixed economy (d, f, S), there exists a
unique market liquidity risk measure. Since we want to compare p˜ of differ-
ent systems under the same market conditions d and f, we have to consider
the following natural generalization: the market liquidity risk measure p˜ can
be interpreted as a function on the set of all systems. I.e., given fixed mar-
ket conditions (d, f), the market liquidity risk measure p˜ is a function from⋃∞
n=1 M˜(n+3)×n∗ to [0, 1] which is defined on the individual systems via propo-
sition 1. Note that p˜ yields the same number applied on equivalent systems.
In order to indicate the affiliation of a variable with the system, I write
the respective system as an upper index or in brackets if necessary. Later on,
we will need the following definition.
Definition 4 Let (d, f, S) be an economy. Bank i is in default if
pei + ci + zi +
∑
k
Lki − x¯i < 0.
Hence, a bank is in default if it is insolvent, i.e., the difference of market value
of total assets and notional obligation is negative. Ceteris paribus, the next
proposition explores the effect of an increase in one variable of the system on
p˜. The proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 2 Assume that S, S ′ ∈ M˜(n+3)×n∗ are two banking systems un-
der the same market conditions (d, f) and that S and S ′ are identical except
for one entry. Other things being equal, i ∈ {1, ..., n} :
• If ci(S ′) > ci(S), then p˜(S ′) ≤ p˜(S).
• If zi(S ′) > zi(S), then p˜(S ′) ≤ p˜(S).
• If yi(S ′) > yi(S), then p˜(S ′) ≥ p˜(S).
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In words, the growth of the liquid assets and the payments received from out-
side the system do not increase the market liquidity risk measure. However, p˜
is monotonically increasing in the liabilities to institutions outside the system.
Interestingly, I cannot state such easy relations if I alter Lij or ei. If Lij
increases, We observe two contrasting effects. We have to consider bank i
and bank j separately. Assume that we increase Lij. For bank i, the notional
obligation x¯i increases. In the case of no default, si increases. Thus, the
market liquidity risk measure p˜ should increase. For bank j, sj decreases in
the no default case. Hence, one could expect p˜ to decrease. The same is true
for the illiquid assets ei : one also finds two contrasting effects. Suppose that
ei(S) increases to ei(S
′). On the one hand, sS
′
i (p) is smaller than s
S
i (p) as
long as sS
′
i (p) ≤ ei(S). But, if sS′i (p) > ei(S), then sSi (p) = ei(S) and sS′i (p)
is greater than sSi (p). Thus, I cannot derive a unique trend of the market
liquidity risk measure p˜. This fact motivates the following proposition which
investigates the impact of the magnitude of the illiquid asset on the financial
stability of the system as well as on the financial stability of a single bank.
Maximizing the stability of a single bank does not imply a larger stability of
the system:
Proposition 3 An absolute growth of the illiquid asset ei improves bank i’s
solvency and its capital asset ratio. However, the stability with respect to
market liquidity risk of the entire banking system m˜ may decrease.
The idea of proposition 3 is that oversized price shocks can induce large sales
of the illiquid asset also in the system with higher amount of ei. In this case,
the increased disposals of ei may even deteriorate the situation on the market
compared to the system with small amounts of the illiquid asset. The proof
can be found in the Appendix.
To summarize, the penultimate proposition 2 yields clear statements about
the dependence of the market liquidity risk measure on the quantities ci, zi
and yi. It is not possible to predict the change in p˜ if I increase ei or Lij. How-
ever, I want to find an unambiguous relation between Lij and p˜. Therefore,
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I suggest the following definition.
Definition 5 Let (d, f, S) be an economy. We assume that both banks are
solvent at the beginning t = 0. The system S is called unbalanced (i < j) if
∃i, j such that
p0ej + cj + zj +
∑
k Lkj − x¯j
p0ei + ci + zi +
∑
k Lki − x¯i
> 1,
ei > ej, ci < cj, zi < zj, yi > yj, ∃p′ ∈ (0, 1) and ∃ξ > 0 such that
si(p
′) = ei and sj(p′ − ξ) = 0 and the subsystem S˜ ⊂ S under the same
market conditions (d, f) and consisting only of bank i has market liquidity
risk measure p˜(S˜) > p′.
In words, bank i is less solvent than bank j and bank i’s supply curve is
greater for all p. One can even find a price p′ for which bank i has to sell all
illiquid assets, the market liquidity risk measure of the subsystem consisting
only of bank i is greater than p′ and bank j does not have to sell any illiquid
assets. This means that a price shock leading to the price p′ results in a
reduction of the illiquid asset price in both systems S and S˜ while bank j
does not have to sell any illiquid assets at the price p′. Hence, bank j is in
a much better state than bank i. Since an increase of Lji rises the value of
bank i’s assets and increases bank j’s notional obligation, there must be a
small enough  > 0, such that Lji +  does not increase or even reduces the
market liquidity risk compared to Lji. Similarly, a small enough η > 0 exists
such that the system with Lij − η instead of Lij does not have a greater
market liquidity risk. I state this notion of balancing the difference between
bank i and j formally in the following proposition and give the proof in the
appendix.
Proposition 4 Assume that S, S ′, S ′′ ∈ M˜(n+3)×n∗ are three banking systems
under the same market conditions (d, f). If the system S is unbalanced (i <
j), then
• ∃ > 0 such that p˜(S ′) ≤ p˜(S) where the system S ′ is identical to S
except for Lji(S
′) = Lji(S) +  and
• ∃η > 0 such that p˜(S ′′) ≤ p˜(S) where the system S ′′ is identical to S
except for Lij(S
′′) = Lij(S)− η.
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In words, if a banking system is unbalanced (i < j), increasing the payments
from bank j to bank i or decreasing the liabilities due by bank i to bank j
reduces the market liquidity risk of the system.
It is not possible to find a monotonic relation between the illiquid asset ei of
a single bank i and the stability of the system if we hold the other parameters
constant. However, the next proposition states that shifting some wealth in-
vested in the illiquid asset to the liquid asset increases system stability. The
proof is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 5 Assume that S, S ′ ∈ M˜(n+3)×n∗ are two banking systems un-
der the same market conditions (d, f), which are identical except for the en-
tries ci and ei. If we increase the amount of the liquid asset from ci(S) to
ci(S
′) and reduce the magnitude of the illiquid asset from ei(S) to ei(S ′) by
the same amount for any bank i ∈ {1, ..., n} such that
ei(S) + ci(S) = ei(S
′) + ci(S ′),
then, other things being equal, the market liquidity risk measure decreases:
p˜(S ′) ≤ p˜(S).
In the previous analysis, the parameter r∗ is assumed to be fixed and given. I
will loosen this assumption for the next two propositions. Besides increasing
liquidity, strengthened capital requirements are a further widely discussed
measure in order to stabilize a banking system. However, since I do not
only focus on default or solvency risk of a single bank but also on market
liquidity risk, I find the following result: increasing the lower bound on the
capital asset ratio r∗ during the crisis decreases system stability with respect
to market liquidity risk because banks then have to sell more illiquid assets in
order to achieve the strengthened standards. This fact is formulated precisely
in the following proposition and it is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 6 Assume that S, S ′ ∈ M˜(n+3)×n∗ are two banking systems un-
der the same market conditions (d, f), which are identical except that the
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lower bound on the capital asset ratio is higher in S ′ :
r∗(S ′) > r∗(S).
Then, the market liquidity risk in S ′ is greater than or equal to the one in
S :
p˜(S ′) ≥ p˜(S).
However, this result is not the whole story: if banks adapt their capital
structure to stronger capital standards before the crisis, they have to sell
less illiquid assets in financial distress. The reason is that a higher capital
asset ratio can better absorb price declines than a lower one. In other words,
after the same price shock in both systems, the one with the lower capital
standards has to sell more liquid and illiquid assets in order to reestablish
the capital asset ratio. Hence, ex ante increased capital requirements reduce
market liquidity risk. The result is formulated in the next proposition, the
proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 7 Assume that S, S ′ ∈ M˜(n+3)×n∗ are two banking systems un-
der the same market conditions (d, f), which are identical except for the en-
tries yi :
yi(S) > yi(S
′)
and the lower bound on the capital asset ratio:
r∗(S ′) > r∗(S).
Hence, the yi differ such that each bank is able to fulfill the capital asset ratio
in its system at the beginning. Then, the market liquidity risk in S ′ is lower
than or equal to the one in S :
p˜(S ′) ≤ p˜(S).
Hence, the results suggest an increase of the capital adequacy constraint be-
fore the crisis when banks are able to raise equity. Note that the previous
proposition discusses the case of banks which adapt their capital structure
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without an increase of total assets. However, if banks, for example, expand
the size of their balance sheets by raising equity in follow on public offers and
invest larger total amounts in illiquid assets in good times instead of paying
off some debt, more illiquid assets may have to be liquidated during a subse-
quent crisis period. Therefore, stronger capital requirements may ideally be
imposed in combination with severe liquidity standards so that banks do not
have to sell more illiquid assets in times of financial distress.
In this section, most of the propositions are stated in terms of p˜. Addi-
tionally, these propositions also provide results about the stability of systems
with respect to market liquidity risk via m˜ = 1− p˜.
The following two propositions provide two concrete examples. I choose
standard demand functions d and distribution functions f and compute the
fixed-point equation pˆ = E[p2|pˆ]. The proofs are given in the appendix.
Proposition 8 We assume that d(p) = − 1
α
ln(p) for some α > 0 and x ∼
N (0, σ2). Hence, d−1x (z) = e−α(z−x) and f(x) = 1√2piσe
− x2
2σ2 . Then, the equa-
tion for the future illiquid equilibrium price reads as
pˆ = e
α2σ2
2
−αs(pˆ).
Proposition 9 Let us suppose that d(p) = − 1
α
ln(p) for some α > 0 and
x ∼ U(−1, 1). Hence, d−1x (z) = e−α(z−x) and f(x) =
{
1
2
, x ∈ [−1, 1]
0 , otherwise
.
We obtain the following fixed-point equation:
pˆ =
sinh(α)
α
e−αs(pˆ).
The two examples look very similar and for small α << 1, the two factors
sinh(α)
α
and e
α2σ2
2 are close to one. But, I find the following important differ-
ence: for larger α, the factor e
α2σ2
2 increases much faster in α. This difference
is important: suppose that we want to choose the appropriate market condi-
tions (d, f) in order to measure the market liquidity risk of a given banking
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system via p˜ resulting from example 1 or example 2. If the next equilib-
rium price is expected to have a large upside potential, we should choose the
normal instead of the uniform distribution.
5 Application
I apply the stability measure with respect to market liquidity risk on quar-
terly Austrian banking system data from 2006 until 2008. The data includes
balance sheet information of all Austrian banks and the interbank matrix
which indicates the financial interlinkage among banks. It is achieved from
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) data combined with an estimation
technique which is explained in Boss et al. (2004). Structural features of the
Austrian bank balance sheet data base (MAUS) and the major loan register
(GKE) are used. Austrian banks have to disclose connections with other
banks according to seven different banking sectors, Central Bank (OeNB)
and foreign banks. This reporting makes sub-matrices of the interbank ma-
trix accessible and allows to reconstruct all interbank exposures. I am not
allowed to disclose the absolute numbers.
The Austrian banking system consists of more than 800 banks. I am aware
of the fact that my application is very rough since the data only contains
coarse balance sheet information and estimations of the interbank liabilities.
My model is very stylized with regard to the classification of assets in liquid
and illiquid ones. Liquid assets contain government bonds, securities, stocks,
bonds and funds traded on the stock exchange and cash reserve including
money of the central bank. It is not the intention of this section to provide a
detailed and accurate investigation of the Austrian banking system. I want
to illustrate the functioning of the stability measure in a concrete implemen-
tation and to show its ability to capture some relevant characteristics of the
current financial crisis.
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Growth factor of
total illiquid assets
2006 2Q 1.0176
2006 3Q 1.0263
2006 4Q 1.0186
2007 1Q 1.0222
2007 2Q 1.0134
2007 3Q 1.0145
2007 4Q 1.0587
2008 1Q 0.9446
2008 2Q 1.0189
2008 3Q 0.9063
2008 4Q 1.0305
Table 1. Growth factor from previous quarter of total illiquid assets of the
Austrian banking system from 2006 until 2008. For instance,
2006 2Q = 1.0176 ∗ (2006 1Q).
Table 1 shows the growth of total illiquid assets of the entire Austrian banking
system. Until fourth quarter of 2007, we observe an increase of the illiquid
assets which can be caused, for example, by an increased value of the existing
assets via stronger demand or by additional acquisitions. Because of herding
behavior, i.e., the fact that most investors follow the trend, and consequential
scarcity, additional acquisitions also reflect a higher valuation of the illiquid
assets. Therefore, I interpret the growth rate as the price development of
the illiquid asset. As of fourth quarter of 2007 to first quarter of 2008, we
obtain a decline in price of more than 5%. Thus, I calibrate the model with
fourth quarter 2007 data using the two examples of the previous section with
normal and uniform distribution for the demand.9 I have to calibrate the
two parameters α (elasticity of demand) and β (scale factor of supply). I
choose α and β so that the system is unstable (p˜ = 1) in December 2007 and
the next equilibrium price is 0.94 after small price shocks. As mentioned in
9I exploit N (0, 1) and U(−1, 1).
36
the last section, if α << 1, the two examples are very similar. Therefore,
the calibration yields the same values for β for the normal and the uniform
approach because α = 0.04. Since α is related to the elasticity of the demand
and a larger α induces a smaller demand, I adapt the α in accordance with
the price of the illiquid asset which indicates the demand.10 β adjusts the
supply curve to the magnitude of the demand, depends on the currency of
the data and is held constant. The parameter values are summarized in table
2.
Normal Uniform
α β α β
2006 1Q 0.047 0.00001 0.047 0.00001
2006 2Q 0.047 0.00001 0.047 0.00001
2006 3Q 0.045 0.00001 0.045 0.00001
2006 4Q 0.045 0.00001 0.045 0.00001
2007 1Q 0.044 0.00001 0.044 0.00001
2007 2Q 0.043 0.00001 0.043 0.00001
2007 3Q 0.042 0.00001 0.042 0.00001
2007 4Q 0.040 0.00001 0.040 0.00001
2008 1Q 0.042 0.00001 0.042 0.00001
2008 2Q 0.042 0.00001 0.042 0.00001
2008 3Q 0.046 0.00001 0.046 0.00001
2008 4Q 0.045 0.00001 0.045 0.00001
Table 2. Parameters α and β with respect to normally and uniformly
distributed demand for the Austrian banking system from 2006 until 2008.
Calibration of the model with fourth quarter 2007 data.
Table 3 reports the stability results. Although the model is simple and the
data does not allow for a precise exploration of the Austrian banking system,
the stability measure with respect to market liquidity risk clearly detects
the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008 which became apparent as subprime
mortgage crisis in the beginning of 2007. It is well-known that the Austrian
10For instance, α{2007 3Q} = 0.042 = 0.040 ∗ 1.0587.
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banking system also suffered from the consequences of this financial turmoil.
Erste Bank announced the taking up of government aid in October 2008
and Kommunalkredit Austria was nationalized in November 2008. It is no
surprise that the measure suggests instability m˜ = 0 for the years 2006 until
2008. As expected from the low parameter α << 1, the normal and the
uniform approach provide very similar results.
Normal Uniform
p˜ pˆ p˜ pˆ
2006 1Q 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.87
2006 2Q 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.86
2006 3Q 1.00 0.87 1.00 0.87
2006 4Q 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.89
2007 1Q 1.00 0.91 1.00 0.91
2007 2Q 1.00 0.91 1.00 0.91
2007 3Q 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.93
2007 4Q 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.94
2008 1Q 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.93
2008 2Q 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.92
2008 3Q 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.90
2008 4Q 1.00 0.89 1.00 0.89
Table 3. Market liquidity risk measure p˜ and expected future illiquid
equilibrium price pˆ after a small price shock with respect to normally and
uniformly distributed demand for the Austrian banking system from 2006
until 2008. Calibration of the model with fourth quarter 2007 data.
Since p˜ ≡ 1 between 2006 and 2008, it is interesting to investigate addition-
ally the expected future illiquid equilibrium price pˆ after small price shocks.
The values are also reported in table 3 and range between 0.86 and 0.94. In
the third quarter of 2008 in table 1, we find a second decline in total illiquid
assets beside the downward spiral in the first quarter of 2008. If I compare
this fraction of time with my results in table 3, I find that both approaches
expect a future equilibrium price of 0.92 in the second quarter of 2008. This
outcome is consistent with the subsequent decrease of the illiquid asset price.
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In section 4, proposition 2 states that an absolute growth of the liquid asset
improves system stability. Proposition 5 proves that shifting some wealth in-
vested in the illiquid asset to the liquid one increases system stability. I can
verify these two propositions empirically: if I double the amount of the liquid
asset in the entire Austrian banking system, I obtain full stability (m˜ = 1)
for all quarters between 2006 and 2008 and for both examples (normal and
uniform). If I double the investment in the liquid asset by reducing the
investment in the illiquid asset by the same amount, I also achieve full sta-
bility of the banking system. Hence, doubling the amount of the liquid asset
in the Austrian banking system in the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 induces an
enormous increase of the stability with respect to market liquidity risk.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents the market liquidity risk measure which has a clear eco-
nomic interpretation: it quantifies the maximal proportional illiquid price
shock a system can sustain without suffering a reduction in the illiquid equi-
librium price. Such a measure exists and is unique for fixed market condi-
tions. I provide a precise mathematical definition of the market liquidity risk
measure which is easily computable. My framework is based on the model
by Cifuentes et al. (2005). Because of their finding that capital adequacy
constraints combined with mark-to-market rules may lead to ‘fire sales’ of
the illiquid asset, I investigate the financial stability of a banking system
with respect to market liquidity risk. I obtain that more rigorous capital
requirements increase system stability if established ex ante whereas they
can deteriorate system stability if introduced in times of financial distress.
From the viewpoint of market liquidity risk, the model suggests the poten-
tial establishment of stronger capital requirements during prosperous periods
when banks are able to raise equity and ideally combined with severe liquid-
ity standards.
The exploration of the market liquidity risk measure yields clear negative
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monotonic dependence on liquidity and positive monotonic dependence on
liabilities outside the system. I identify situations which allow an increase of
the stability with respect to market liquidity risk by altering certain inter-
bank liabilities.
I prove two propositions with regard to the illiquid asset. First, I investigate
the impact of exclusive changes of the illiquid asset: although the growth of
the illiquid asset reduces the default risk of a bank and improves its capital
asset ratio, the stability of the entire banking system may decrease. This
proposition emphasizes that system stability is not the result of maximizing
the stability of each single bank. One also needs to incorporate the market
conditions and the network structure of the system. Second, I show that
shifting some positive amount of money invested in illiquid assets to liquid
assets makes the system always more stable with respect to market liquidity
risk.
My framework is open for different specifications of the market conditions.
However, I suggest two concrete stability measures, compute the two exam-
ples ‘normal’ and ‘uniform’ demand and discuss the relevant difference.
Finally, I apply the two concrete examples of stability measures on quar-
terly Austrian banking system data from 2006 until 2008. In the first quar-
ter of 2008, I observe the first decline of total illiquid assets in the system.
Therefore, I calibrate the model with data of the last quarter of 2007. The
stability measure clearly captures the instability due to the current financial
crisis already as of 2006. The two examples indicate very similar results and
absolutely reveal the phase of the crunch. The decrease of illiquid asset prices
after small shocks predicted by the measure is consistent with the effective
reduction in the data and ranges between 86 and 94% of today’s price. In
accordance with my theoretical result, the Austrian banking system achieves
full stability if I double the amount of liquid assets.
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Appendix
Definition 6 M(n+3)×(n+1) is defined as the space of (n+3)×(n+1) matrices
over R and M˜(n+3)×n ⊆M(n+3)×(n+1) denotes the (n+ 3)× n−dimensional
subspace of matrices of the form

0 ∗ ∗
. . .
...
∗ 0 ∗
∗ · · · ∗ 0
∗ · · · ∗ 0
∗ · · · ∗ 0

where the ∗ stand for
real numbers. M˜(n+3)×n+ consists of the matrices in M˜(n+3)×n with elements
greater than or equal to zero. I use the following notation for matrices in
M˜(n+3)×n+ : 
L11 = 0 · · · L1n y1
...
. . .
...
...
Ln1 · · · Lnn = 0 yn
z1 · · · zn 0
e1 · · · en 0
c1 · · · cn 0

.
Bank names i ∈ {1, ..., n} are arbitrary. Therefore, it is possible that two
different matrices S and S ′ in M˜(n+3)×n+ represent the same banking system
if we permute the bank names. Additionally, a matrix X ∈ M˜((n+1)+3)×(n+1)+
which has only zero entries in the kth row and the kth column, for some
k ∈ {1, ..., n+ 1}, describes the same system as the matrix Y ∈ M˜(n+3)×n+ if
Y is given by deleting row k and column k in X. The next definition provides
the terminology to manage these problems of having different representations
of one system.
Definition 7 By omitting matrices in M˜(n+3)×n+ which have only zero en-
tries in the kth row and the kth column, for some k ∈ {1, ..., n}, I construct
a subset of M˜(n+3)×n+ . It is denoted by M˜(n+3)×n∗ .
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Two matrices S and S ′ in M˜(n+3)×n∗ are called equivalent if a permutation of
the bank names of S exists such that S with permuted indices, Spermuted, is
equal to S ′.
A system is an element S ∈ M˜(n+3)×n∗ .
Let S ∈ M˜(n+3)×n∗ . A subsystem S ′ ⊂ S is a system consisting of a smaller
number k < n of banks than S such that all the banks in S ′, their endow-
ments of the liquid and illiquid asset and the financial interconnections be-
tween each other are also in S. I require that the subsystem S ′ represents
the same ‘world’ as S, but it focuses on a smaller banking network therein.
Hence, S ′ ∈ M˜(k+3)×k∗ and since S ′ has n − k banks less than S and these
banks are outside the system S ′, the yi and zi in S ′ are generally larger than
in S. If bank i is in S and S ′, it has the same notional obligation x¯i and the
same value of its total assets in both systems.
Proof of the fact that E[p2|p] is monotonically increasing in p.
pa < pb ⇒ s(pa) ≥ s(pb) ⇒ d−1x (s(pa)) ≤ d−1x (s(pb)) ∀x ∈ R.

Proof of Proposition 1. We know that E[p2|p] is a monotonically increas-
ing and bounded function in p ∈ [0,∞). It is continuous in p and E[p2|p] ≥ 0
∀p ∈ [0,∞). In order to prove the existence of p˜, we first have to verify the
following observations:
1. If E[p2|p1] > p1 for the illiquid price p1 after the initial shock, the fixed-
point iteration yields a strictly larger equilibrium price pˆ which is the
next higher intersection or contact point of E[p2|p] and the diagonal,
i.e., pˆ fulfills the equation E[p2|pˆ] = pˆ.
2. If E[p2|p1] < p1 for the illiquid price p1 after the initial shock, the fixed-
point iteration yields a strictly smaller equilibrium price pˆ which is the
next lower intersection or contact point of E[p2|p] and the diagonal.
I show the first statement. Analogous arguments prove the second case. Sup-
pose that the next intersection or contact point (of E[p2|p] and the diagonal)
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larger than p1 is pˆhigh. Starting with E[p2|p1] > p1, the fixed-point iteration
yields a monotonically increasing sequence of anticipated illiquid prices which
is bounded by E[p2|pˆhigh] = pˆhigh. Hence, the fixed-point iteration converges
to the price pˆhigh because a monotonic and bounded sequence converges. This
proves the first statement.
I am looking for a p˜ ∈ [0, 1]. If p ∈ [0, 1) and E[p2|p] 6= p, the above state-
ments imply that there exists an  > 0 such that the fixed-point iteration
yields the same next equilibrium price (6= p) for all q ∈ [p − , p + ]. Thus,
such a p cannot be a p˜. Therefore, the only possible candidates for p˜ are 1
and the prices p ∈ [0, 1) such that E[p2|p] = p. In this proof, I start with
1 and move from the right end of the interval [0, 1] to the left: the idea is
to check all numbers p satisfying the equation E[p2|p] = p between 1 and 0.
Fortunately, searching from the right to the left, the only possible candidate
apart from 1 is the largest p ∈ [0, 1) which fulfills the equation E[p2|p] = p or,
if no such p exists, 0. Proof of this fact: suppose that p is the largest number
between 0 and 1 which satisfies E[p2|p] = p and there exists a p˜ < p. Then,
if p1 = p, the fixed-point iteration yields the next illiquid equilibrium price
p which is not strictly larger than p. This is a contradiction to the definition
of p˜. Hence, there are only two possible candidates for p˜ : 1 and/or one ad-
ditional number in [0, 1). Thus, starting from the right to the left, I am only
interested in 1, the first p which induces an intersection or contact point of
E[p2|p] and the diagonal or zero.
The next step is to classify the possible situations of E[p2|.]−curves. I dis-
tinguish the following cases:
1. E[p2|1] > 1,
2. E[p2|1] = 1 and ∃ > 0 such that E[p2|p] > p ∀p ∈ [1− , 1),
3. E[p2|1] = 1 and ∃ > 0 such that E[p2|p] = p ∀p ∈ [1− , 1],
4. E[p2|1] = 1 and ∃ > 0 such that E[p2|p] < p ∀p ∈ [1− , 1),
5. E[p2|1] < 1.
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Note that these five cases are disjoint and that these are all possible situa-
tions. For each case, I make a further distinction according to the following
criteria: moving from the right end of [0, 1) to the left end,
• the largest p with E[p2|p] = p is a contact point,
• the largest p with E[p2|p] = p is an intersection point,
• there is no p with E[p2|p] = p.
Figure 3 illustrates the eleven cases. It is easy to check that there exists a
p˜ for each situation. Figure 3 indicates the correct and unique p˜ for each
graph.
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     Contact point    Intersection point No contact/intersection
1. E[ p2 | 1]>1
          ~    ~ ~
      p                              p                       p
2. E[ p2 | 1]=1,
∃ε>0:
E[ p2 | p]>p
∀p [1-ε,1)∈
 
    
    ~            ~ ~
  p  p  p
3. E[ p2 | 1]=1,
∃ε>0:
E[ p2 | p]=p
∀p [1-ε,1]∈
   
  ~
 p
4. E[ p2 | 1]=1,
∃ε>0:
E[ p2 | p]<p
∀p [1-ε,1)∈
 ~             ~
p        p
5. E[ p2 | 1]<1
 ~             ~
p         p
Figure 3. The eleven possible cases for p˜

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Proof of Proposition 2. I derive the implications with respect to p˜ by
making use of the formulae for t˜i, ti, vi and si. Since I am interested in the
curve E[p2|p] for all p ∈ [0, 1], I have to discuss the following four cases11:
1. i(S), i(S ′) not in default: If ci increases from ci(S) to ci(S ′), then
t˜S
′
i (p) ≤ t˜Si (p) as long as t˜S′i (p) ≤ ci(S) and t˜S′i (p) > t˜Si (p) other-
wise. Hence, on the set {p ∈ [0, 1] : ci(S) < t˜S′i (p) < ci(S ′)}, sSi (p)
is already greater than zero whereas sS
′
i (p) = 0. I can conclude that
sS
′
i (p) ≤ sSi (p) since an increasing ci decreases vi(p).
If zi increases from zi(S) to zi(S
′), then t˜i, ti, vi and si decrease.
If yi increases from yi(S) to yi(S
′), then t˜i, ti, vi and si increase.
2. i(S ′) not in default and i(S) in default: Note that this case only occurs
if I increase ci and zi.
12 Obviously, sS
′
i (p) ≤ sSi (p).
3. i(S) not in default and i(S ′) in default: Note that this case only occurs
if I increase yi. I find that s
S′
i (p) ≥ sSi (p).
4. i(S), i(S ′) in default: sS
′
i (p) = s
S
i (p).
The smaller the supply function si(p), the higher E[p2|p]. Therefore, p˜ de-
creases if I increase ci (p˜ decreases with respect to increase of zi/ p˜ increases
with respect to increase of yi). The last step can be proved by showing this
fact for each case in figure 3.

Proof of Proposition 3. The first statement is obvious. Suppose that
ei(S) increases to ei(S
′). Using the formulae for t˜i, ti, vi and si, the following
statements are obvious. sS
′
i (p) is smaller than s
S
i (p) as long as s
S′
i (p) ≤ ei(S).
11Note that the four cases correspond to subsets of the interval [0, 1]. For instance,
{p ∈ [0, 1] : i(S),i(S’) not in default} = {p ∈ [0, 1] : xSi (p) = x¯i(S) and xS
′
i (p) = x¯i(S
′)}.
This case analysis is necessary since the formulae for t˜i, ti, vi and si depend on the market
value of bank i’s interbank liability xi.
12Consequence of formula xi = min
{
x¯i, ci + pei + zi +
∑n
j=1 Lji
}
.
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sS
′
i (p) is greater than s
S
i (p) if s
S′
i (p) > ei(S). In the latter case, E[p2|p] is
smaller in system S ′ and a fully stable system S as given in the third graph
in the first row of figure 3 may turn into a less stable system S ′ in the second
graph of the first row.

Proof of Proposition 4. If I increase Lji or decrease Lij, bank i is better
off and bank j has to pay more in both cases. Since the supply curve s is
continuous with respect to changes of the interbank liabilities, I can increase
Lji or decrease Lij such that ∃κ > 0 (κ < ξ for ξ in definition 5), ∃p ∈ (0, 1)
(p < p′ for p′ in definition 5), si(p) = ei, sj(p − κ) = 0 and p − κ > p′ − ξ.
It follows that s increases on (0, p) and decreases on (p, 1). Therefore, E[p2|.]
decreases on (0, p) and increases on (p, 1). Because p˜ was in (p, 1], the market
liquidity risk measure decreases. The last step can be checked by means of
figure 3.

Proof of Proposition 5. I consider the formulae for t˜i, ti, vi and si and
distinguish the following three possible cases.
1. i(S), i(S ′) not in default: Since p ≤ 1, shifting some amount from ei to
ci decreases t˜i. t
S′
i (p) ≤ tSi (p) as long as tS′i (p) ≤ ci(S). Additionally,
tS
′
i (p) increases until ci(S
′) for falling p whereas tSi (p) already terminates
at the level ci(S). Hence, s
S
i (p) starts to grow earlier than s
S′
i (p) if p
ranges from the right end to the left end of [0, 1]. Because ei(S
′) < ei(S)
and vS
′
i (p) ≤ vSi (p), I find the following result for the supply function:
sS
′
i (p) ≤ sSi (p).
2. i(S ′) not in default and i(S) in default: sS
′
i (p) < s
S
i (p) because ei(S
′) <
ei(S).
3. i(S), i(S ′) in default: sS
′
i (p) < s
S
i (p) because ei(S
′) < ei(S).
With the reasoning used in the end of proof of proposition 2, I conclude that
p˜(S ′) ≤ p˜(S).
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Proof of Proposition 6. I explore the formulae for t˜i, ti, vi and si for each
bank i separately. I fix an arbitrary p ∈ [0, 1] and distinguish the following
two possible cases:
1. If bank i is in default in the system S for the illiquid asset price p, it is
also in default in S ′ and I obtain ti(p) = ci, si(p) = ei in both systems.
2. i(S), i(S ′) not in default: because
∑n
j=1 Lji + pei + ci + zi > x¯i, the
formulae for t˜i(p) and vi(p) consist of a positive term independent of
r∗ and a negative term divided by r∗. Hence, ti(p) and si(p) increase if
I augment r∗.
Thus, sS
′
i (p) ≥ sSi (p), sS′(p) ≥ sS(p) and I get p˜(S ′) ≥ p˜(S).

Proof of Proposition 7. I explore the formulae for t˜i, ti, vi and si for each
bank i separately. I fix an arbitrary p ∈ [0, 1] and distinguish the following
three possible cases:
1. If bank i is in default in the system S for the illiquid asset price p, I
obtain tSi (p) = ci, s
S
i (p) = ei. Hence, t
S′
i (p) ≤ tSi (p) and sS′i (p) ≤ sSi (p)
since the bank in system S ′ is not necessarily in default.
2. If bank i is in default in the system S ′ for the illiquid asset price p, it is
also in default in S and I obtain ti(p) = ci, si(p) = ei in both systems.
3. i(S), i(S ′) not in default: because
∑n
j=1 Lji + pei + ci + zi > x¯i, the
formulae for t˜i(p) and vi(p) consist of a positive term independent of
r∗, which is identical in both systems (at least when ti(p) = ci for the
curve vi(p), otherwise vi(p) is zero anyway), and a negative term divided
by r∗ :
x¯i−(
∑n
j=1 Lji+pei+ci+zi)
r∗ for t˜i(p) and
x¯i−(
∑n
j=1 Lji+pei+ci+zi)
r∗p for vi(p).
Note that r∗ =
∑n
j=1 Lji+ei+ci+zi−x¯i∑n
j=1 Lji+ei+ci+zi
in both systems which implies that∑n
j=1 Lji+ei+ci+zi−x¯i
r∗ is identical in both systems:∑n
j=1 Lji(S
′) + ei(S ′) + ci(S ′) + zi(S ′)− x¯i(S ′)
r∗(S ′)
=
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∑n
j=1 Lji(S) + ei(S) + ci(S) + zi(S)− x¯i(S)
r∗(S)
.
Since r∗(S ′) > r∗(S) and
∑n
j=1 Lji(S
′)+ei(S ′)+ci(S ′)+zi(S ′)−x¯i(S ′) >∑n
j=1 Lji(S) + ei(S) + ci(S) + zi(S)− x¯i(S), we obtain∑n
j=1 Lji(S
′) + pei(S ′) + ci(S ′) + zi(S ′)− x¯i(S ′)
r∗(S ′)
≥
∑n
j=1 Lji(S) + pei(S) + ci(S) + zi(S)− x¯i(S)
r∗(S)
.
Hence, tS
′
i (p) ≤ tSi (p) and sS′i (p) ≤ sSi (p).
Thus, sS
′
i (p) ≤ sSi (p), sS′(p) ≤ sS(p) and we get p˜(S ′) ≤ p˜(S) since the
differences of the yi also predict a lower market liquidity risk for S
′.

Proof of Proposition 8. I assume that d(p) = − 1
α
ln(p) for some α > 0 and
x ∼ N (0, σ2). Hence, d−1x (z) = e−α(z−x) and f(x) = 1√2piσe
− x2
2σ2 . We obtain
pˆ = E[p2|pˆ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
d−1x (s(pˆ))f(x)dx
=
∫ ∞
−∞
e−α(s(pˆ)−x)
1√
2piσ
e−
x2
2σ2 dx
=
1√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−αs(pˆ)
1√
2σ
eαxe−
x2
2σ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
e
−( x√
2σ
−
√
2σ
2 α)
2
e
α2σ2
2
dx
= e
α2σ2
2
−αs(pˆ) 1√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e
−( x√
2σ
−
√
2σ
2
α)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
e−g(x)2
1√
2σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
g′(x)
dx
= e
α2σ2
2
−αs(pˆ) 1√
pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e−y
2
dy︸ ︷︷ ︸√
pi
.
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In the last equation, I exploit the substitution g(x) = x√
2σ
−
√
2σ
2
α. Thus,
pˆ = e
α2σ2
2
−αs(pˆ).

Proof of Proposition 9. Let us suppose that d(p) = − 1
α
ln(p) for some α >
0 and x ∼ U(−1, 1).Hence, d−1x (z) = e−α(z−x) and f(x) =
{
1
2
, x ∈ [−1, 1]
0 , otherwise
.
We obtain
pˆ = E[p2|pˆ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
d−1x (s(pˆ))f(x)dx
=
∫ 1
−1
e−α(s(pˆ)−x)
1
2
dx
=
1
2
e−αs(pˆ)
∫ 1
−1
eαxdx
=
1
2
eα − e−α
α
e−αs(pˆ)
=
sinh(α)
α
e−αs(pˆ).
Thus,
pˆ =
sinh(α)
α
e−αs(pˆ).

Proposition 10 Let (d, f, S) be an economy and p˜ the market liquidity risk
measure. Then,
p˜ =
{
max
{
{0} ∪ ((d−1 ∗ f) ◦ s− id)|−1[0,1)(0)
}
, A
1 , B
where A means
(d−1 ∗ f) ◦ s(1) ≥ 1 and ∃ > 0 : (d−1 ∗ f) ◦ s(p) ≥ p ∀p ∈ [1− , 1]
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and B is
(d−1 ∗ f) ◦ s(1) ≤ 1 and ∃ > 0 : (d−1 ∗ f) ◦ s(p) ≤ p ∀p ∈ [1− , 1].
Proof of Proposition 10. We know that figure 3 shows all the possible and
important cases for the definition of the market liquidity risk measure p˜. One
can easily check that the formal definition of p˜ in proposition 10 coincides
with the description of p˜ in proposition 1 for each situation in figure 3.

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1 Introduction
Governmental interventions in the financial sector have been observed in
many countries during the current financial crisis. The systemic relevance
of large institutions has necessitated the bailout of many banks. It is often
argued that rescue packages for banking systems were important in stabi-
lizing the alarmingly deteriorating liquidity in the interbank market and to
prevent spillover effects onto the real economy via the credit market. How-
ever, this policy has evident drawbacks. More specifically, the state has to
intervene in, and therefore to distort, the market economy and to support
private enterprises with the tax yield. Interventions which ensure the survival
of large banks may even encourage ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) institutions to
increase their risky positions, because they enjoy a free state guarantee. This
market discipline problem makes future crises and interventions more likely.
Although the government can protect the real economy from turmoil in the
financial sector, the expenses may increase the default risk of the entire state.
In Switzerland, the ‘too big to fail’ discussion changed rapidly to the topic
of ‘too big to rescue’, since the country is very small compared to the size of
the banks and the potential rescue packages. The gross domestic product of
Switzerland amounted to over 500 bn CHF, compared to a total asset value
of both banks Credit Suisse (CS) and UBS of approximately 2400 bn CHF
at the end of 2009.
In this study, we focus on the Swiss situation and compute the value of
the state guarantee for CS and UBS quarterly in a dynamic setup using data
from 2004 through 2009, as if the guarantee had been explicit.4 In our liabil-
ity insurance approach, debtholders are protected in the case of a default, not
the shareholders, and the bank is eliminated, i.e., its license is withdrawn.
The model detects the current crisis by indicating high guarantee values for
both banks, UBS and CS, in the years of 2008 and 2009, compared to the
lower premiums in earlier years. For instance, for CS (UBS) we obtain a
4Per definitionem, it is impossible to determine the value of the implicit guarantee,
because the intervention is uncertain and the implementation is unspecified.
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maximum value of 21.3 (12.7) bn CHF in 2008. This is the premium the
bank has to pay for debt insurance for one year. Although these numbers
seem to be large, compared to profits, because it is questionable whether
one of the banks could have afforded the premium payments in this time
of distress, one has to take into account the reduced interest payments to
depositors which would disburden the banks on the other side. The reason
for this reduction is that the liability insurance induces a riskless bond to
debtholders who would have asked for higher risk premiums in this market
situation. In the concrete case of UBS, many creditors even withdrew their
deposits. On the other hand, the guarantee values seem to be low compared
to the total insured liabilities. However, realistic loss given defaults are much
smaller than total amounts of insured debt. Additionally, we observe a de-
cline in the guarantee value for the UBS after the bailout in October 2008.
The calculation of the guarantee value is based on the theory of valuing
debt and deposit insurance by Merton (1974, 1977, 1978). We closely follow
Lucas and McDonald (2006, 2009), who adapt this theory for detecting the
risk inherent in government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), namely Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F). Although UBS and CS are privately owned
and not founded by the government, the implicit guarantee exists, just be-
cause of the size of the banks and importance for the Swiss economy. We
extend the approach of Lucas and McDonald in a variety of ways. Contrary
to their work, we not only consider a single point in time, but determine the
evolution of the guarantee value. We calculate the guarantee value, the value
at risk and the expected shortfall quarterly for the time horizon of 2004-2009.
Investigating the time before the financial turmoil and incorporating a ‘tail
event’ enables us to examine the entire dynamics of the model predictions
throughout the crisis. Moreover, we compare our results with the respective
market default risk perception, the credit default spreads of the UBS and the
CS. We are aware that the market CDS spreads include more information
than the model implied CDS spreads, e.g., liquidity.
The sensitivity of the results with respect to different model specifications
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and parameters, e.g., jumps in the asset path or various volatility levels, is
analyzed. We conduct a policy analysis with respect to political and regu-
latory relevant and frequently discussed measures, such as increased capital
requirements or an augmented number of audits. Strengthened capital re-
quirements and the increased number of audits reduce the guarantee value
substantially.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing litera-
ture. Section 3 provides the conceptual framework clarifying the term im-
plicit guarantee by differentiating it from the concepts of no or an explicit
guarantee. Moreover, we give an overview of the Swiss situation and describe
the key figures of UBS and CS. Section 4 is devoted to our model. Section 5
explains our data and the parameter specification for the benchmark scenario
and presents the results. In section 6, we analyze our model with respect to
policy relevant parameters. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
In this section, we provide a selective review of the literature. First, the dif-
ferent approaches for determining the size of the guarantee primarily relevant
for our work are presented. Then, we document empirical evidence of market
responses to the TBTF status of banks. Some of the theoretical approaches
to describe the potential consequences of government guarantees on market
discipline or risk-taking are briefly described in the appendix.
The literature in the research on valuing loan or deposit guarantees is ex-
tensive. We cannot present it completely. We identify two primary strains
of the literature: contingent-claim and market-based analysis. In the latter
valuation method, traded securities with and without guarantees are com-
pared. The price difference between these securities is interpreted as the
implied value. Hsueh and Kidwell (1988) study municipal bonds, which re-
ceived a credit guarantee from the state government resulting in a raise of
the credit ratings of all bonds to the highest category. Not surprisingly, they
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find that the savings in interest were the highest for bonds with very low
ratings before the credit enhancement. Passmore (2005) calculates the im-
plicit guarantee value to F&F (shareholders and homeowners) using a cash
flow approach. These financial institutions were created by the United States
Congress. Nevertheless, the securities carry no explicit government guaran-
tee. Due to the implicit guarantee that the government would not allow
such important institutions to fail, the buyers of their securities offer them
high prices and lenders grant them advantageous interest rates. This implicit
guarantee was tested by the subprime mortgage crisis, which forced the U.S.
government to bail out and put into conservatorship Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in September 2008. Passmore (2005) estimates gross subsidies from the
borrowing advantage by comparing yields on financial corporate debt and
debt of a GSE. Baker and McArthur (2009) investigate the spread between
the average cost of funds for small banks and the cost of funds for systemic
relevant institutions with assets in excess of 100 bn USD. They find that the
gap widened in the period from the fourth quarter of 2008 through the second
quarter of 2009, after the government bailouts largely established ‘too big to
fail’ as an official policy. The evaluation of loan insurance using contingent-
claim models is based on the initial work of Merton (1977, 1978), following
his research on corporate debt pricing (Merton (1974)) by applying option
pricing theory. Merton (1977) derives an options-based formula to evaluate
the cost on the guarantor for issuing a guarantee of bank deposits. This
pricing model is built on the isomorphic correspondence between deposit in-
surance and common stock put options. The payoff-structure of the loan
guarantee at the maturity date of the bond is identical to that of a European
put option. Therefore, the Black and Scholes’ option pricing techniques can
be applied. Merton (1978) extends the earlier framework taking into account
explicitly surveillance costs and random auditing times. These additional
default checkups are an important feature used to make the model more re-
alistic. It is unreasonable to interpret debt as a European put option with
a maturity of 5 years without any audits and detections of default in the
meantime. Ronn and Verma (1986) use time series data on the variance and
market value of bank’s equity, as well as the book value of its debt, to infer the
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underlying variance and value of assets and then arrive at a point estimate
of the appropriate deposit premium from the put’s value. Giammarino et al.
(1989) incorporate bankruptcy costs, suggesting that it might be optimal for
the auditor to not immediately force a bank to stop operations if the asset
value reaches the value of liabilities. They adapt the framework to Canadian
banks. Dermine and Lajeri (2001) anticipate the risk characteristics from the
lending function of banks and show that conventional insurance premiums
underestimate the fair value. The implicit guarantee value and correspond-
ing risk of F&F is also studied by Lucas and McDonald (2006, 2009) using a
contingent-claim framework analogue to Merton (1978) incorporating audits
during maturity. Guarantee value, risk neutral and actual default probabil-
ities are computed via Monte Carlo simulation and compared to the results
with varying variables including asset volatility, capital requirements, exoge-
nous growth, monitoring frequency and debt adjustment rules.
The seminal papers of O’Hara and Shaw (1990) and Flannery and Sorescu
(1996) investigate different market effects in connection with the financial
crisis, where the Continental Illinois Corporation was involved in July 1984.
The former authors investigate equity prices before and after the Comptroller
of the Currency testified that some banks were simply TBTF and that to-
tal deposit insurance would be provided for those banks. Using an event
study, they report an average 1.3% abnormal return to common equity of
TBTF banks. In contrast, Flannery and Sorescu (1996) ask whether banks’
debtholders were rationally pricing bank-specific risks during 1983-1991. In
a panel regression analysis, they find that when government’s willingness to
insure bank holders of subordinated notes and debentures (SNDs) declined
over time5, debenture yields reflected the specific risk of the banks as lever-
age and asset quality. Therefore, investors became more diligent about pric-
ing default risks when authorities stopped protecting financial institutions.6
5For instance, in 1991, debenture holders suffered losses when the Bank of New England
or Southeast Banking Corporation went bankrupt.
6Also Avery et al. (1988) analyze the relation between default risk premium on SNDs
and accepted measures of bank risk for the years of 1983 and 1984. They find no relation-
ship. Few reasons for this result are provided in Flannery and Sorescu (1996).
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Morgan and Stiroh (2005) revisit the Continental case focusing on the rela-
tionship between TBTF bond spreads and risk relative to other banks. In
particular, they argue that spreads and ratings will differ to the extent that
investors and rating agencies disagree about the probability of government
support where they make the assumption that investors use ratings as a proxy
for risk. Their findings suggest that also the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, which limits regulators’ dis-
cretion to support distressed relevant banks7 did not entirely shake investors’
beliefs in TBTF, which put the results of Flannery and Sorescu (1996) a bit
into perspective. Rime (2005) also uses bank ratings to test the presence of
TBTF expectations, but these exclusively for the years of 1999-2003. Rating
agencies distinguish between issuer rating, that also considers possible ex-
ternal support, and individual rating, that focuses on the intrinsic capacity
of a bank for debt repayment. Therefore, the difference should also reflect
the TBTF status of a bank. In a regression analysis, he finds that variables,
like total assets or market share, characterizing the TBTF status of a bank
have a positive and significant effect on the rating difference. Hence, any
implications regarding the impact on market discipline is dependent on the
degree that market investors incorporate these ratings into their investment
decisions. Vo¨lz and Wedow (2009) examine the same question, but consider
investors on the credit default swap (CDS) market, i.e., the authors quan-
tify the potential distortion due to the TBTF expectation on CDS prices
in 24 countries during the years of 2002-2007. Their findings confirm that
the spreads reflect banks’ risk and also a size distortion. Spreads tend to be
lower for banks with a larger size, relative to home country’s gross domestic
product. The consequences of the bailout policies on financial institutions,
which are not TBTF, are studied in the paper of Gropp et al. (2010). The
authors show that the risk-taking of banks outside the safety net increases
significantly in the presence of TBTF institutions. The argument is that in-
stitutions with an implicit guarantee benefit due to lower refinancing costs,
7For details about the FDICIA, especially in the context of the TBTF discussion, see
the review of Wall (2010) and references therein. This article was originally published in
1993, but due to the current crisis and discussion was reprinted in 2010.
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which enables them to offer more attractive conditions for depositors, or
obligors, with higher deposit or lower loan rates, respectively. Consequently,
the fiercer competition brings unsecured institutions to take riskier positions.
3 Background
3.1 Terminology
To clarify the term implicit guarantee, we describe the two extreme cases of
no guarante and an explicit guarantee. We then discuss the gray area ‘in
between,’ which we call implicit. We assume that the guarantor is free of
default risk.
Figure 1 depicts the situation of a bank without a guarantee. We observe
the usual concept: debtholders receive the riskless rate and an adequate risk
premium for the default risk of the bank. We assume that shareholders have
a limited liability, i.e., shareholders lose the invested capital in default. Note
that this case only occurs for institutions which are not ‘too big to fail’ or
not systemic relevant for another reason.
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Figure 1. No guarantee: debtholders (DH) obtain default risk-adequate
premium, shareholders (SH) are liable with the invested capital.
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We present the case of an explicit guarantee for debt in Figure 2, since our
paper focuses on liability insurance. Explicit means that the bank and a
guarantor agree about the risk transfer on a contractual basis, such that the
bank is able to offer a riskless bond. Hence, debtholders are not exposed to
the default risk of the debt issuing bank. In contrast, the guarantor has to
bear the losses. However, she requires an appropriate insurance premium.
Shareholders have a limited liability, which implies that the bank is elimi-
nated after default.
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Figure 2. Explicit guarantee: guarantor insures debtholders (DH) against losses
in default, DH have a riskless bond, shareholders (SH) are liable with the
invested capital.
Figure 3 illustrates the case of an implicit guarantee. We call the guaran-
tee implicit if there does not exist a contract between bank and guarantor,
although there are reasons to assume that a guarantee exists.8 Therefore,
the intervention is uncertain and the implementation is not specified. The
uncertainty of the intervention is represented by the dashed line and is, for
example, affected by the perception of systemic relevance and the ability of
8It is possible that market participants suppose that a bank is systemic relevant and
has an implicit guarantee before default. But the guarantor may decide to let the bank
go bankrupt in default. In this case, the implicit guarantee exists until default, in our
terminology.
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the guarantor to afford the bailout. In Switzerland, CS and UBS are both as-
sumed to be ‘too big to fail’.9 This implies that both banks enjoy an implicit
guarantee, where an intervention is relatively certain. This fact was proven
for UBS in October 2008. Generally, debtholders and shareholders benefit
from the potential guarantee. For instance, the bailout of UBS avoided the
bankruptcy of the institution and protected shareholders from a total loss and
debtholders from damages in the case of a default. We previously noted the
hereby also induced market discipline problems. Additionally, debtholders
receive a reduced risk premium, because of the anticipation of the guarantee.
Supplementary, shareholders profit from reduced refinancing costs of the bank
because of the implicit guarantee. One may argue that banks transmit their
refinancing benefits on to credit users, although it is debatable (see Passmore
(2005)). The actual allocation of these benefits depends on the form of the
intervention (for instance, expropriation of shareholders or capital injection)
and frictions between the stakeholders (for instance, the partial transmission
of funding advantages). However, shareholders, debtholders and borrowers
profit by the implicit guarantee, whereas the guarantor receives no premium.
In other words, the more likely the rescue, the more grants the guarantor a
subsidy.
9See page 16, Schlussbericht der Expertenkommission zur Limitierung von volks-
wirtschaftlichen Risiken durch Grossunternehmen, 4. October 2010.
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Figure 3. Implicit guarantee: debtholders (DH) and shareholders (SH) benefit
from potential bailouts; the guarantor does not receive a premium.
As aforementioned, CS and UBS enjoy an implicit state guarantee. Our goal
is to compute the premiums for debt insurance of these two banks from 2004
until 2009, as if the guarantee had been explicit.
3.2 Swiss situation
In this section, we briefly describe the prominent and pivotal role of the fi-
nancial industry as a whole and of UBS and CS for the Swiss economy in
particular. As illustrated in Table 1, 12.70% of the GDP of Switzerland is
created by the financial industry. We note that this number does not reflect
the additional indirect value for the real economy through a financing infras-
tructure provided by such a pronounced and diversified financial industry,
especially for an export oriented economy like Switzerland.
UBS has 1340.5 bn CHF of total assets (end of 2009) and about 26 thou-
sand employees. Hence, it is the largest bank in Switzerland. The bank is the
biggest asset manager worldwide (over 2000 bn CHF assets under manage-
ment). Although one UBS branch originates in 1747, the current structure
and size are founded in the merger of the Union Bank of Switzerland and the
Swiss Bank Corporation in the year 1998, as well as the acquisition of the US
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Employment Economic value creation
absolut in percent absolut in percent
(in mio CHF) (of GDP)
Banking industry 113’000 3.60% 40’735 9%
Insurance industry 48’000 1.50% 16’717 3.70%
Affiliated operations 23’000 0.70% n.a. n.a.
Financial industry 183’000 5.80% 57’551 12.70%
Table 1. Employment and economic value creation of the financial
industry in 2006 for Switzerland. Source: Swiss Federal Department of
Finance: Situation und Perspektiven des Finanzplatzes Schweiz, Swiss
Federal Statistical Office.
brokerage firm PaineWebber in 2000. Besides UBS, the other global financial
player, namely CS (1031.4 bn CHF of total assets and 1229 bn CHF of assets
under management), employs more than 20 thousand people in Switzerland.
More than 30% of bank lending to domestic small and medium sized enter-
prises (SMEs) is provided by the two institutions. In former years, about
3-5% of the Swiss GDP was created by UBS and CS.
In Figure 4, the development of total assets of both banks and of the Swiss
GDP during the last years is illustrated. The massive increase and decrease
of the UBS’s balance sheet length is striking. From 2003 to 2006, the sum of
total assets of UBS and CS grew by 162%, a value of 1382 bn CHF.
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Figure 4. Asset development of UBS and CS.
This was nearly the eightfold GDP up to the end of 2007, which is an excep-
tional relation with respect to international standards. During the subprime
crisis, the two big banks were hit hard, especially the UBS was faced with
huge losses and write-downs on subprime mortgage investments. Both banks
took measures to strengthen their resilience, e.g., reducing risky positions,
the overall size of trading portfolio and balance sheet. They raised sizeable
amounts of capital, for example, UBS raised capital in the early stages of the
crisis. However, in October 2008, it became necessary for the government to
intervene. The primary element of the rescue package for the UBS, put to-
gether by the Swiss government, the Financial Market Supervisory Authority
(FINMA) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB), was the possibility for the
UBS to transfer up to 60 bn USD of illiquid assets to a special purpose ve-
hicle of the central bank to facilitate their orderly liquidation. The Swiss
government subscribed to mandatory convertible notes in the amount of 6
bn CHF, and hence, strengthened the bank’s capital base.
4 Model
Based on the insights of Merton (1977), we use an option pricing approach
for computing UBS and CS’ implicit guarantee. The idea is to evaluate such
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insurance as a European put option on the underlying UBS or CS assets
with maturity date of debt and with the future book value of debt as the
strike price. Thus, considering deposit insurance, the emphasis is not on the
various interventions observed in the current crisis to ensure a bank’s survival.
Its potential and costly resurrection after the default is not captured. We
compute the put option price via Monte Carlo simulation. In accordance
with Lucas and McDonald (2009), we incorporate negative jumps −φ ≤ 0.
For a standard Brownian motion W and a Poisson process N with intensity
µ, the dynamics of the asset paths are defined via
dAt
At−
= (rf + gt − δE0
A0
+ µφ)dt+ σAdWt − φdNt
which yields the risk neutral discrete time formula
At+h = At exp
(
(rf + gt − δE0
A0
− σ
2
A
2
+ µφ)h+ σA
√
h
)
(1− φ)Nh (1)
where h is the time step, A is the asset and E denotes equity. Subscripts
represent time. rf is the risk-free rate, gt is the externally financed asset
growth, δ is the dividend yield on equity, δE0
A0
is the dividend yield on assets,
σA is the volatility of the assets and  ∼ N (0, 1) is standard normally dis-
tributed. The process N counts the number of jumps. If a jump occurs, we
obtain At = (1−φ)At−. The term µφ corrects the drift for the average effect
of jumps. If we neglect the terms of magnitude o(dt), the probabilities of the
occurrence or the absence, respectively, of a jump in the interval between t
and t+ dt are µdt or 1− µdt, respectively. In formulae:
P[Nt+dt −Nt = 1] = µdt
and
P[Nt+dt −Nt = 0] = 1− µdt.
Hence, it is a reasonable approximation to assume a Bernoulli distribution
for the occurrence of jumps between t and t+ dt.
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Since the initial market value A0 and volatility σA of the assets are not di-
rectly observable, we use the following equations which are based on Merton’s
framework and which are solved simultaneously for A0 and σA :
10
E0 = A0e
−qTN(d1)− L0e−rfTN(d2) + A0(1− e−qT ), (2)
σA = σE
E0
A0
(
N(d1)e
−qT + (1− e−qT ))−1 , (3)
d1 = (log(A0/L0) + (rf − q + σ
2
A
2
)T )/(σA
√
T ),
d2 = d1 − σA
√
T
where T is the maturity of liabilities, L0 is the strike price (initial book value
of liabilities) and q = δE0
A0
is the payout rate of assets. Thus, we again use
option pricing theory since equity can be valued as a call option. The two
advantages of this method are first, that one can avoid to directly estimate
the outstanding market value of the complex liability structure and second,
one does not have to use traded debt prices which already reflect the value
of the implicit guarantee.
We assume the following evolution of the book value of liabilities L which
adjust towards a target liability to asset ratio at several different adjustment
rates:
Lt+h = Lte
(rd+γgt)h + Itαth(λ∗ − Lterdh/At)At (4)
where αt denotes the annual rate of adjustment, λ
∗ is the target liability to
asset ratio, It is an indicator variable that equals 1 in a period where lia-
bilities are adjusted and 0 otherwise, rd is the growth rate of liabilities to
cover promised coupons and γ is the fraction of externally financed growth
supported by debt.
At some pre-specified dates we allow for audits which examine if the asset
liability ratio falls below the default trigger. If this case occurs, asset and lia-
bility processes are stopped, i.e., the values are held constant and multiplied
10The last term A0(1− e−qT ) =
∫ T
0
qA0e
−qtdt in the first equation represents the accu-
mulated dividend payments.
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with the appropriate discount rate until maturity. At maturity, we collect
the put option payoffs max(LT − AT , 0) of all paths and compute the put
price as the expected discounted payoff.
For the correct interpretation of the put option price it is crucial to em-
phasize the important role of the maturity. We suppose that all debt has a
maturity of time T which is a strong assumption. In order to get reasonable
and realistic results, one calculates the mean of all the different maturities
provided by the bank. However, one has to be aware of the fact that the put
option price represents the state guarantee with respect to debt and deposits
with maturity T.
5 Benchmark scenario
5.1 Data and parameter specification
All initial firm specific values for our simulation are reported in the Tables
4, 5 and 6 in the Appendix. As described previously, the initial market
value of the assets and asset volatility can be inferred by solving equations
(2) and (3), where we choose the sum of the initial market value of equity
and the book value of liabilities as a first guess for the market value of the
assets A0.
11 The benchmark scenario does not include jumps. The risk free
rate is the Switzerland government bond yield (with respective maturity).12
For the dividend yield q we use the respective annual yield for all quarters.
Moreover, we employ the historical equity volatility, calculated as a rolling 63-
day annualized standard deviation of equity price changes. Time to maturity
T is set to one year, since we are interested in determining the guarantee value
for one year. Here, we assume that debt is homogenous with a maturity of
one year. This is a strong assumption, recognizing that the debt structure of
these banks is diversified with a variety of maturities. With more information
11We exploit the MATLAB routine lsqnonlin and ensure that A0 and σA are in the
same range.
12The treasuries are called ”Obligationen der Eidgenossenschaft”.
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about the maturity structure, one could use the average maturity to carry
out the calculations. Later, we discuss the five year case to illustrate the size
effects of this change. In Figure 5, historical equity and corresponding asset
volatilities of UBS and CS are plotted. Not surprisingly, the volatility level
is moderate up to the end of 2006. The second part of our considered time
period is characterized by great uncertainty expressed in asset volatility up
to 7% in 2008.
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Figure 5. First panel: equity volatility calculated as a rolling 63-day annualized
standard deviation of equity price changes. Second panel: model implied asset
volatility with a debt maturity of one year.
The simulation of the asset and liability path (equations (1) and (4)) requires
the specification of other parameters. The asset growth rate is determined
by the logarithm of the difference in total assets.13 Therefore, we adjust the
asset growth rate dynamically at every starting point based on the average
growth rate of the last year by taking into account the changing market con-
ditions. This procedure hopefully enables us to infer more precise results. A
growth rate based on the long time average would have drastically failed in
the UBS case, where the balance sheet length roughly halved during the years
2008 and 2009. The promised return on debt is determined by the fraction of
13In formulas: log
(
Total Assett
Total Assett−1
)
averaged over the last four quarters.
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annualized interest rate expenses over the outstanding liabilities of the last
quarter. We then fix some parameter values for both banks (see Table 2),
a procedure that is quite similar to that in Lucas & McDonald (2006). It
gives us the opportunity to compare our results and check them regarding
consistency.
The target liability to asset ratio is set according to the Basel II frame-
Name Value
Jump intensity and size 0
Target liability to asset ratio 0.92
Debt proportion of external financing 1
Adjustment of liabilities to higher target 0.8
Adjustment of liabilities to lower target 0.4
Frequency of updating debt 252
Default trigger 1
Frequency of checking bankruptcy trigger per year 4
Time steps per year 252
Time to maturity 1y
Number of Monte Carlo simulations 40000
Table 2. Common parameter values for both banks and for all starting
times in the benchmark scenario.
work to 92%, where we are aware of the fact that Basel incorporates risk
weighted assets or stressed recovery values to fix the capital requirements. It
is assumed that asset growth is completely externally financed by debt. Lia-
bilities adjust gradually and asymmetrically.14 The 80% annual adjustment
up versus 40% annual adjustment down reflects the difficulty for a financial
institution to deleverage in times when asset values are declining. For the
default trigger, based on the asset value relative to book liabilities, we begin
with a value of 1, which is checked four times annually. This is in line with the
current Swiss regulatory framework15, where banks inform the Swiss Finan-
14In equation (4) we set It ≡ 1. Hence, the liabilities are adjusted in each time step,
which is typically each day.
15See Article 13, ERV (Eigenmittelverordnung).
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cial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) quarterly about their capital
resources. Since we obtain the equity volatility based on daily data, we also
run the simulation with 252 time steps annually. To include stressed markets,
Lucas and McDonald (2006) raise volatilities by four times its normal level
when assets fall to 101% of liabilities, taking into account increasing volatil-
ities during these times. We assume this procedure occurs over the period of
moderate market conditions (2004-2007). In turbulent times (2008-2009), we
adjust this approach by halving the volatility when assets increase to 110% of
the liabilities. The identification of financially stressed, or unstressed, times
takes place in every time step of the simulation.
5.2 Results
The results, namely guarantee value, value at risk (VaR) at a confidence level
of 95% and the corresponding expected shortfall (ES) for CS and UBS with
respect to one year over the time period 2004 to 2009 (quarterly) are reported
in Table 3. The first two years are characterized by values almost all equal to
zero. During 2006 and 2007, the guarantee value and VaR are also quite low,
where we first note that it is reasonable to calculate the ES considering the
tail risk. Second, the increasing numbers for the ES in the last two quarters
of 2007 can be linked to the start of the subprime crisis with rising market
uncertainty. In Figures 6 and 7, we present the guarantee value development
in connection with firm specific events. Although we are aware of the lim-
itations of our approach, particularly a comparison of CS and UBS in the
third and fourth quarter of 2008 is remarkable. Up through the bailout on
October 16th in 2008, the insurance premiums for UBS were higher than for
CS. In the fourth quarter of 2008, all measures for UBS roughly bisect and
had lower values than CS for the rest of the considered period. We think
that this risk reduction can be partly explained by making the implicit state
guarantee certain throughout the bailout. The contrary and high level values
for CS, where, e.g., the ES in the fourth quarter of 2008 is five times higher
than in the third quarter and the put price for CS in the fourth quarter is
less than twice as high as the UBS value in the third quarter, are puzzling.
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An explanation is the increasing uncertainty on the CS side (see also Figure
5) - possibly increased since, at this point in time, the situation at the bank
was not clear as well as whether Switzerland could have afforded another
bailout. Note, the results are dependent on market variables, like market
capitalization of equity and equity volatility. Both quantities are determined
by the market risk perception, and therefore, are also influenced by the im-
plicit state guarantee, which is anticipated by market participants, to some
extent. We suppose that, for instance, the observed market capitalization of
equity would be lower without an implicit guarantee. Hence, the premiums
would be higher for the banks.
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Figure 6. Guarantee value CS in the benchmark scenario (mio CHF). The text
modules document the most important firm-specific events.
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CS UBS
Time Guarantee VaR ES Guarantee VaR ES
value (95%) value (95%)
2004 Q1 0 0 30 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0
2005 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 10 0 0 0
2006 Q1 10 0 160 0 0 0
Q2 70 0 1440 188 0 3781
Q3 0 0 40 7 0 135
Q4 0 0 0 9 0 179
2007 Q1 20 0 500 13 0 254
Q2 0 0 90 39 0 778
Q3 240 0 4730 345 0 6931
Q4 0 0 70 268 0 5377
2008 Q1 1170 9000 19960 2033 16325 31380
Q2 10 0 170 224 0 4504
Q3 1230 8370 21880 12682 73088 98144
Q4 21340 93860 117830 5173 38183 57373
2009 Q1 2770 21860 36390 1402 9980 24527
Q2 380 0 7610 192 0 3852
Q3 0 0 70 2 0 33
Q4 0 0 40 0 0 3
Table 3. Results of the benchmark scenario. All values for the guarantee value (put
price), value at risk (VaR) at a confidence level of 95% and corresponding expected
shortfall (ES) are reported in mio CHF.
74
2004 Q2 Q3 Q4 2005 Q2 Q3 Q4 2006 Q2 Q3 Q4 2007 Q2 Q3 Q4
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Guarantee value UBS
m
io
 C
HF
 
 
 
 
 
14
.2
.; 
9.
8 
bn
 C
HF
 g
ro
up
 re
su
lt 
fo
r 2
00
5
 
 
 
 
 
13
.2
.; 
11
.5
 b
n 
CH
F 
gr
ou
p 
re
su
lt 
fo
r 2
00
6
 
 
 
 
 
3.
5.
; R
ei
nt
eg
ra
tio
n 
of
 H
ed
ge
−F
un
ds
 D
illo
n 
Re
ad
6.
7.
; n
ew
 C
EO
 M
. R
oh
ne
r  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
1.
10
./1
0.
12
.; 
4 
an
d 
11
.3
 b
n 
CH
F 
wr
ite
 o
ff 
an
d 
13
 b
n 
CH
F 
   
re
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n;
 d
ow
ng
ra
de
 o
f r
at
in
g 
by
 S
&P
 a
nd
 F
itc
h 
   
 
 
 
PutPrice
2008 Q2 Q3 Q4 2009 Q2 Q3 Q4
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
Guarantee value UBS
m
io
 C
HF
 
 
 
 
 
30
.1
.; 
4.
4 
bn
 C
HF
 lo
ss
 a
nn
ou
nc
em
en
t f
or
 2
00
7
 
 
 
 
 
1.
4.
; n
ew
 c
ha
irm
an
 P
. K
ur
er
 a
nd
 1
5 
bn
 C
HF
 re
ca
pi
ta
liz
at
io
n
16
.1
0.
; b
ai
lo
ut
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
26
.2
./4
.3
.; 
ne
w 
CE
O
 O
. G
rü
be
l a
nd
 n
ew
 c
ha
irm
an
 K
. V
illi
ge
r
 
 
 
 
 
20
.5
.; 
21
.3
 b
n 
CH
F 
lo
ss
 a
nn
ou
nc
em
en
t f
or
 2
00
8
 
 
PutPrice
Figure 7. Guarantee value UBS in the benchmark scenario (mio CHF). The
text modules document the most important firm-specific events.
In Figures 8 and 9, market and model implied CDS spreads are plotted.16
Data for the CDS spreads (1 year) are provided by Datastream. For calcu-
lating the model CDS spreads, the probability of default PD is determined
by counting the defaults in the Monte Carlo simulation. The model implied
loss given default (LGD) is a percentage average of the positive put payoffs.
Then we solve the following equation for the premium s,
T∑
t=1
(1− PD)te−rf ts =
T∑
t=1
(1− PD)t−1 PDe−rf t LGD. (5)
where s denotes the CDS spread. The left hand side of (5) represents the
sum of the expected premiums payed to the CDS holder and the right hand
side equals the expected loss given default for the insurer. Under the strong
assumptions that PD, LGD and rf are constant over time we obtain the
analytic solution to (5):
s =
PD · LGD
1− PD .
16We only consider risk-neutral default probabilities in this paper since they correspond
to the ones implied by the CDS spreads.
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Figure 8. Model implied CDS spreads and market quotes for CS. Source:
Datastream.
Not astonishingly, the graphs exhibit similar phenomena as previously de-
scribed for the guarantee values. During the pre-crisis period market spreads
are very low, but higher than the model implied spreads. With the start of
the financial crisis in 2007, market and model predict much higher spreads.
The informative value of the difference between market and model is lim-
ited. On the one hand, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) or Greatrex (2008)
have shown that just about 30% of the variation in market CDS spreads can
be explained by the variables of the Merton approach. On the other hand,
market CDS spreads represent the insurance premium for the next unit of
CHF and not for the total amount of liabilities. The values of the state
guarantee for one year are typically in the range of 1 up to 21 bn CHF. If
we compare these numbers with the dividend payout to cantons by Zu¨rcher
Kantonalbank (ZKB), we find similar dimensions relative to the magnitude
of the balance sheet. The bank has total liabilities of approximately 117 bn
CHF and pays 381 Mio CHF to the community. In the case of ZKB, the
premium is not computed with respect to the model, but is rather a political
decision.
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Figure 9. Model implied CDS spreads and market quotes for UBS. Source:
Datastream.
6 Sensitivity and policy analyses
In this section, we check the robustness of our results with respect to changes
in volatility and time to maturity and investigate the political relevant moni-
toring measures leverage ratio and number of audits. The latter explorations
are highly important for regulatory implications.
6.1 Jumps
Our benchmark case assumes continuous asset paths. To introduce stress sit-
uations in the form of price drops on the asset side, we compute the guarantee
values of CS and UBS for several discontinuity scenarios of the asset path.
As described in the model section, we incorporate negative jumps if the two
parameters φ and µ are positive. Tables 7 and 8 present the liability insur-
ance premiums for one year and the corresponding expected shortfalls for the
(annualized) intensities µ = 252 ∗ 0.004 = 1.008 and µ = 252 ∗ 0.001 = 0.252,
respectively, and jump sizes of φ = 0.01 and φ = 0.05, respectively. Hence,
we investigate daily jump probabilities of 0.4% and 0.1% and collapses of the
asset path of 1% and 5%.
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First, we observe that jumps, i.e., the anticipation of plunges on the asset
side, generally have a substantial augmenting impact on guarantee values.
Second, increasing the jump size leads to remarkable increases in the values.
For example, guarantee values for UBS are zero for φ = 0 (benchmark case)
and φ = 0.01 in the first quarter of 2005, whereas they achieve values of
1.8 bn CHF and 8.33 bn CHF for jump sizes of 5%. Third, the effect of in-
creasing intensities is also observable: guarantee values are generally greater
with higher intensity. Fourth, the impact of jumps is enormous in the years of
2004 through 2007, before the crisis. They are moderate during the turbulent
times in the years of 2008 and 2009. The reason for this result are different
volatility adjustment regimes for different market situations in our model,
which are described in the data and parameter specification subsection and
intend to avoid unrealistic volatility values.
In summary, our results yield a clear monotonic relationship between jump
size and intensity, on the one hand, and guarantee values, on the other hand.
More specifically, the higher the expected negative jumps or the greater the
intensity of the jumps, the higher the guarantee values.
6.2 Volatility
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the sensitivity analysis of the guarantee value
with respect to the asset volatility. The shaded area represents the put price
for one year for different asset volatilities between 0.9 and 1.1 times the
benchmark volatility.
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Figure 10. Guarantee value CS and deviation caused by changes in asset
volatility. The area plot illustrates the guarantee value for asset volatilities
between 0.9 and 1.1 times the ones induced by the benchmark scenario.
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Figure 11. Guarantee value UBS and deviation caused by changes in asset
volatility. The area plot illustrates the guarantee value for asset volatilities
between 0.9 and 1.1 times the ones induced by the benchmark scenario.
In 2008, the difference of the guarantee value induced by the low (-10% com-
pared to the benchmark case) and the high (+10%) asset volatility is at most
5 bn CHF for both banks and up to one third of the high value in percentage
for UBS. In previous years, the difference of at most 500 mio CHF is much
smaller in absolute terms. However, the high guarantee value is 4.5 times
larger than the low one for CS in the third quarter of 2007. Thus, we find
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that the put price is more sensitive in percentage terms to asset volatility
variations before the crisis than in turbulent times.
Having discussed the effects of an asset volatility band width around the
benchmark, we also want to describe alternative specifications for the his-
torical equity volatility, which influence the estimation of the asset volatility.
We decided to incorporate the last quarter of equity price changes for cal-
culating the benchmark volatility, because we also determine guarantee val-
ues quarterly, therefore always using a new information set without overlap.
However, other time intervals are possible. We report the numerical values
for a rolling 10-, 63-, 126- and 252-days window for both banks in Table 9 in
the Appendix. In Figure 12, we see the corresponding premium evolutions
for CS.17
As expected, longer time horizons naturally smooth the premium develop-
ment, since erratic changes become less important, but more persistent, with
a longer time horizon. This effect is readily identifiable on the right side of
Figure 12. The peak of the premium evolution moves from the third quarter
of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009 on a diminishing level, where the relative
changes are less dramatic. In the benchmark case, the premium drops after
reaching the maximum by about 88%, whereas the decline for the 252-day
horizon occurs nine months later and is just about 65%. If we compare the
premiums integrated for the years 2004-2009 across the volatility specifica-
tions (see Table 9) we observe, for both banks, a bisection of the benchmark
amount with the 252-days calculation horizon.
17We depict here only the bank CS, because the UBS value in the third quarter of 2008
for the 10-day window reached a high level, which distorts the graphical illustration.
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Figure 12. Guarantee values refering to a historical equity volatility respectively
calculated as a rolling 10-, 63-, 126- and 252-days annualized standard deviation
of equity price changes for CS.
6.3 Maturity
In the benchmark scenario, we assumed a homogenous debt structure for both
banks with a maturity of one year. We indicated that we have no informa-
tion about the maturity structure of the liability side of these institutions.18
Therefore, we discuss the case where debt maturity is elongated to five years.
The bank is also insured for the same period. In the Appendix, Table 10,
we report the results of the guarantee value and ES for both cases. The
obtained guarantee values (ESs) range up to 170 bn (480 bn) CHF during
the turbulent times, which is roughly the decuple of the benchmark scenario.
These drastic changes can be explained by higher asset volatilities (solving
equations (2) and (3)) and higher uncertainty due to the longer horizon.
6.4 Leverage ratio
A decrease of the target liability to asset ratio from 92% in the benchmark
scenario to 90% is in line with the current discussion about strengthened
18In Lucas and McDonald (2006), it is assumed that debt with an average maturity of
2.65 years (for Fannie Mae) is rolled over for the studied guarantee period of ten years.
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capital requirements for banks in Switzerland and other countries. Table
11 in the appendix presents the guarantee value and expected shortfall for
the benchmark case and for the lower ratio. The result is highly relevant
with respect to regulatory implications and illustrates that increased capital
requirements significantly reduce the guarantee value for both banks. For
instance, the largest value for CS in the fourth quarter of 2008 declines from
21.3 bn CHF in the benchmark scenario to 18.6 bn CHF. In the first and sec-
ond quarter of 2007, the guarantee value for UBS diminishes even thirteen
times, compared to the benchmark case.
As in the investigation of asset volatility, we find a similar phenomenon:
the percentage differences between a target liability to asset ratio of 92% and
90% are larger in the years before the crisis. Leverage rates of CS and UBS
were around 0.98 in terms of total assets. If we increase the target liability
to asset ratio to 98%, we obtain maximum guarantee values of 33.3 bn CHF
for CS in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 28.9 bn CHF for UBS in the third
quarter of 2008. All values of the years 2004 until 2009 are presented in Table
11 and are substantially higher than in the benchmark case.
Although the result suggests stronger capital requirements, one has to be
aware of the fact that the model does not consider the market for illiquid as-
sets and the issue of ‘fire sales’ of these assets in times of financial distress, as
discussed in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Cifuentes et al. (2005).
Hence, our model ignores market liquidity risk, but focuses on solvency risk.
The current crisis has shown that more rigorous liquidity measures are neces-
sary. The liquidity aspects cannot be captured by this approach. Note that
our results depend on the comparison of already established capital adequacy
constraint regimes. The adjustment of stronger capital ratios needs time and
the implementation has to occur in appropriate market situations. Hence,
the model does not provide the optimal point in time of an increase in capital
requirements.
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6.5 Audits
In our benchmark scenario, the regulatory authority FINMA was assumed
to check the bankruptcy trigger quarterly. This is the typical frequency dur-
ing normal times. Here, we study the effects of an increasing number of
audits. The authority is allowed to conduct monitoring on a daily basis,
especially during a stressed market environment (see, for instance, EBK-
Bankinsolvenzbericht 2008). We adapt the specification from the volatil-
ity adjustment. As soon as the asset path falls to 101% of the liabilities,
the bankruptcy trigger is monitored, additional to the four audits annually.
Thereby, we increase the number of audits and detect more defaults. But,
the losses given default will be smaller, since the regulator is able to cut off
rapidly growing losses. In Table 12, we can see the dramatically reduced
values for the put price and ES. Especially during the years of the financial
crisis, the effects are very pronounced, which indicates that the described
boundary is undercut more often. The most extreme case can be observed in
the fourth quarter of 2008, where the ES of CS decreased to 2% of the former
value. This value is also only slightly higher than the guarantee value, i.e.,
the regulatory authority stopped the business more or less directly, because
no bigger losses could accumulate.
7 Conclusions
We quantify the guarantee value for the liability side of UBS and CS in a
dynamic setup from 2004 until 2009. The model is based on option pricing
theory and the computations are conducted quarterly to obtain the guaran-
tee value, the value at risk and the expected shortfall four times a year. We
provide the results for time horizons of one and five years, i.e., we assume
that debt has a maturity of one or five years, respectively, and that the de-
posit insurance will last during this time period. The results indicate zero
premiums for 2004 and 2005. The high levels of the guarantee value, as of
2008, are up to 22 bn CHF for CS and 13 bn CHF for UBS in the benchmark
scenario. Hence, the model clearly captures the current financial crisis, which
83
became apparent in the beginning of 2007. However, already in 2006, the
guarantee values for both banks start to increase, which may reveal the detec-
tion sensitivity of the model with respect to the upcoming financial turmoil.
Interestingly, whereas the guarantee value for UBS is typically larger than
for CS until third quarter of 2008 in the benchmark scenario, the value for
CS is four times greater after the bailout of UBS in October 2008. We may
explain this finding with the ability of the model to identify the governmental
rescue of UBS. The policy analysis yields a reduction of the guarantee value
with respect to decreased target liability to asset ratio and stress-adjusted
number of audits. Hence, our results support the regulatory measures ap-
plied and discussed in the current situation. The practical implementation of
the deposit insurance with the obliged premium payments according to the
calculated guarantee values is an open issue. First, the cyclical model obvi-
ously generates the highest values during crisis times, where banks are short
of capital and therefore are possibly not able to pay the fees. Second, the low
values during unstressed situations may not allow the insurer to accumulate
sufficient reserves for the potential depositor bailout.
In the next two paragraphs, we embed our results into the current public
discourse about banking regulation in order to clarify (again) the contribu-
tion of our paper. To avoid situations where governmental interventions are
necessary, different regulatory measures and institutional reforms are being
publically discussed including raising capital requirements, stronger liquidity
measures and increasing the number of audits. Moreover, splitting big banks
to obtain system-irrelevant-units, firm size restrictions, contingent convert-
ible bonds or setting up a rescue fund to bail out system critical institutions.
However, some of these approaches can have undesirable effects. For exam-
ple, more severe capital requirements are not able to exonerate governments
from the role of lender of last resort. Even though holders of contingent
convertible bonds - in contrast to equity holders - do not benefit from the
profit chance of high risks before conversion and their asking for adequate
risk premiums may induce discipline in bank’s risk-taking, a well-established
market for these instruments and profound knowledge of its shortcomings
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are not yet existent. For instance, financial stability of the entire banking
system may deteriorate if banks hold their contingent convertible bonds mu-
tually to a large extent. Additionally, if debt is converted into equity, this
signal may cause investors’ panic and exacerbate share price declines. Hence,
the gained solvency is lost rapidly and the problem of governmental aid per-
sists. Another solution serves as the basis of this paper: make the implicit
state guarantees for large banks explicit, i.e., impose a premium for deposit
insurance by the government. In this case, a ‘too big to fail’ bank has to
pay for the state guarantee accordingly to the size of its liabilities and its
risk exposures. Consequently, banks know that they will not be rescued in
threatening situations, which solves the market discipline issue, and deposits
will be similar to safe bonds supported by the government, which reduces
contagion effects within the financial system. Hence, to avoid market disci-
pline problems, one assumes that in the case of a default, only the depositors
or lenders to the bank are bailed out, not the shareholders who decide upon
an institution’s risk policy. However, it is not our intention to propagate
the idea of deposit insurance since it also induces new problems. For exam-
ple, if deposits become safe bonds, the business activity of the bank changes
drastically. Moreover, governments have to expect moral hazard when banks
have paid their premiums (see, e.g., Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (2004)).
To discuss the practicability of deposit insurance and indicate an adequate
premium, it is nevertheless essential to know the approximate magnitudes of
the pure guarantee value without considering any externalities.
Finally, we refer to the topic of executive compensation. As long as the
state provides an implicit guarantee to large banks, it is difficult to argue
that only shareholders are allowed to be concerned about managers’ com-
pensation. Chesney et al. (2011) find that incentives to take asset risk can
be large compared to incentives to increase the value of assets even if CEOs
are mainly compensated with stocks instead of stock options. Our work em-
phasizes the strong impact of asset volatility and hereby asset risk on the
guarantee value. Hence, the reduction of risk-taking incentives in compensa-
tion packages may be a valid concern raised by the state in order to reduce
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the costs of an implicit guarantee.
Appendix
Literature review continued
Though not directly relevant for our work, we provide a very selective overview
of the recent theoretical literature about market distortions created by gov-
ernment interventions in the financial sector. Cordella and Yeyati (2003)
develop a framework in which the ex-ante announced commitment of the au-
thorities to bail out insolvent banks in certain unfavorable states of nature
induces a lower equilibrium risk level. A bailout is here ‘not to withdraw’ the
bank license and payment of the outstanding liabilities in the case when the
bank is not able and not willing to meet its liabilities via recapitalization.
In general, the potential bailout generates two opposite effects: a market
discipline problem and the so called value effect. On the one hand, the prob-
ability of surviving depends less on the bank’s choice of risk and more on
the supervisory authority’s action, therefore, shareholders have an incentive
to choose riskier asset portfolios for maximizing expected profits, which of
course, also increases the default risk. On the other hand, governmental
guarantees naturally increase the survival probability and future rents due
to lower refinancing costs, thus raising the charter value in the case of a de-
fault, which, in turn, generates the incentive to protect it by reducing the
asset portfolio risk. In the theoretical part of their paper, Ennis and Malek
(2005) analyze the impact of deposit insurance (full and partial coverage),
TBTF policy and the interaction of both on the banks’ decision process to
attract depositors. The authors also make the assumption of a probabilistic
bailout (‘constructive ambiguity’), which is dependent on a bank’s size. The
bailout itself is specified so that all deposits beyond the deposit insurance
system are covered. One of the main policy implications they can draw is
that a tougher intervention regime, i.e., lower bailout probability for all bank
sizes, induces the reduction of the equilibrium bank size and risk level.
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Abstract: In a sequential game, I show that locational competi-
tion and lobbying can prevent optimal regulation of multinational
enterprises which may relocate headquarters or relevant parts to
other countries. I find that global regulation maximizes the ag-
gregate utility function of the countries. However, the resulting
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) suggests a world with-
out regulation. Country-specific regulatory schemes of different
levels of rigor turn out to be unstable and may lead to subopti-
mal equilibria because of locational competition. If I allow for tax
competition, the SPNE is no regulation combined with minimum
taxation. Again, this outcome is not the optimal joint policy of
the countries. I apply the game to the specific example of bank-
ing regulation and compare deposit insurance with tighter capital
rules and liquidity measures. I show that deposit insurance can
have a disciplinary effect on banks’ risk-taking.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to analyze the regulation of multinationals in a global
framework. My model incorporates more than one country in order to explore
and include locational competition. This characteristic of my setup is cru-
cial since it allows to take into account the following contradictory situation:
on the one hand, governments have to regulate headquarters, subsidiaries
or branches of multinational enterprises located in their jurisdictions, but,
on the other hand, they also want to attract and retain these firms for tax
reasons and because of labor supply. Hence, in my model, the same entity is
simultaneously responsible for offering best conditions and for regulation or
supervision. Countries decide upon their regulatory policies by anticipating
the behavior of the firms. I consider firms which can relocate their headquar-
ters or relevant parts to other countries and are allowed to lobby. The latter
is the intention of influencing the political decision making via individual
contact to legislators or administration officials or via public relations. Here,
lobbying means that governments maximize profits of the firms in addition
to their own utility functions. Thus, I do not mean knowledge transfer to
policy makers by specialists from the private sector, but mainly the bias of
policy makers.
The sequential game between states and firms suggests global rules and co-
operation between states and reveals the potential failure of country-specific
regulation under locational competition. Although global regulation maxi-
mizes the countries’ aggregate utility function, the resulting SPNE without
global agreement and under lobbying turns out to be no or minimum regula-
tion. I.e., no country can benefit by changing from no regulation to optimal
regulation if the other countries maintain their no regulation strategies. Fur-
thermore, countries even always obtain a better outcome when choosing no
regulation instead of optimal regulation, no matter what the other countries
choose. In order to elaborate a more realistic view, I additionally include tax
competition between the countries. The lack of international rules and tax
harmonization may enable multinational firms to play national regulations
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and taxation policies against each other.
After the analysis of generic multinationals, I apply the game to the con-
crete example of banks. I introduce a banking model based on concepts of
Freixas and Rochet (2008) and Suarez (1994). This application is interesting
since it allows to endogenize and to specify optimal regulation. I compare
two different regulatory approaches: statutory deposit insurance and tighter
rules regarding capital and liquidity. I show that deposit insurance can have
a disciplinary effect on banks’ risk-taking since it abolishes the reduced re-
financing costs of systemic relevant banks. Additionally, I find that deposit
insurance induces higher payoffs for the countries under global regulation if
corporate taxes are sufficiently low.
A novel feature of my model is the focus on the relevant mobile parts of
the firm with respect to regulation and the hereby induced universal validity
of the game across industries. That is to say, topical banking regulation,
such as capital requirements, often targets complete banks and not only sub-
sidiaries or branches in the home country since governments had to rescue
the entire holdings of multinational banks during the current crisis. Thus, it
may be circumvented by relocating banks’ headquarters. On the other hand,
industrial firms are able to avoid strong regulatory obligations with regard
to, for instance, healthy working conditions or environmental protection if
they displace single production plants. Hence, investigation of relocation of
banks’ headquarters and industrial production plants instead of the entire
multinational firms reveals interesting similarities in the otherwise very dif-
ferent regulatory frameworks of financial institutions and industrial firms.
A further important advantage of this approach is that countries can be
assumed to be substitute goods instead of complementary goods: banks only
have one single headquarters to place and firms’ efficiency considerations
lead to preference for the country with the lowest production and regulatory
costs (if countries do not otherwise differ and potentially increased logistic
efforts are offset by the low production costs). Hence, my model indeed con-
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siders multinational firms as global players which produce for global markets.
My paper contributes to the growing literature on the regulation of multina-
tionals and to the comprehensive literature on tax competition. Although the
focus of my work and my strive toward universality in modeling is unique
to my knowledge, I found some approaches which are related. Calzolari
(2001, 2004) and Olsen and Osmundsen (2003) deal with the regulation of
multinationals in sophisticated models including, for example, asymmetric in-
formation, investment opportunities, production costs or different ownership
structures and investigate the impact of various structural conditions. Dalen
and Olsen (2003) and Calzolari and Loranth (2010) concentrate on multi-
national banks and the differences in regulation of branches or subsidiaries.
Since I explore regulation under locational competition induced by reloca-
tion of a relevant unit regardless of either headquarters (mainly for banks
which depend on bailout of the complete holding) or other parts (in par-
ticular for pollutive subsidiaries of industrial or pharmaceutical enterprises),
differentiation of subsidiaries and branches is not significant in my context.
Siebert (2006) discusses the term locational competition and points out that
an international system of rules has to take care of the different norms and
preferences of the countries. Conrad (2005) states that firms’ location de-
cisions also depend on factor prices, labor productivity and infrastructure
services. A comparison of concrete national policy instruments and interna-
tional emissions trading programs to meet the Kyoto targets is implemented
in Hahn and Stavins (1999).
I can only choose a few references from the substantial literature on tax com-
petition. Two extensive surveys are provided by Wilson (1999) and Fuest et
al. (2005). Bretschger and Hettich (2005) adduce empirical evidence of de-
creasing effective tax rates with rising globalization for a panel of 12 OECD
countries in the period from 1967 until 1996. Slemrod and Wilson (2009)
demonstrate that the elimination of tax havens makes all non-haven coun-
tries better off. The game of Brett and Weymark (2008) confirms the validity
of the ‘race to the bottom’ thesis and the game of Chen and Smekal (2004)
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shows that international tax cooperation can improve welfare of the partici-
pating countries.
The organization of the paper is as follows: section 2 provides the model
setup and the results of the sequential game about regulation of multina-
tionals including locational competition and lobbying. Section 3 extends the
game by introducing tax competition. I discuss the concrete example of
regulation of multinational banks in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Regulation versus locational competition and
lobbying
I consider two countries C1, C2 and two firms f1, f2.
3 At the beginning, I
assume that firm fi is headquartered (or the relevant subsidiaries or branches
for regulatory reasons are located) in country Ci for i ∈ {1, 2}. Cj is called
home country for fi if fi’s headquarters or considered parts are in Cj. Hence,
I focus on the essential mobile parts of the multinational firms with respect to
regulation (and taxation in the next section). The two firms are multinational
enterprises in the sense that they can easily displace the location of the
relevant parts to the other country for transaction costs T. Thus, I explore a
particular type of foreign direct investments. I use the term multinationals
since it is commonly used in the literature and because firms are allowed to
operate (not considered) subsidiaries or branches in more than one country in
my model. However, it would also be correct to employ the term international
firms in order to point out the focus on the considered parts of the firm
which are either located in the first or in the second country. Although the
regulation of subsidiaries and branches of banks or the question of optimum
allocation of the production plants in various countries (for instance because
of transport routes or different economic, legal and political conditions) are
still important issues, I concentrate on the basic problem of regulation of
3I discuss the most simple case. Mutatis mutandis (for example, determination of a
decision rule for the situation of one firm which relocates and two countries which do not
regulate), my results remain the same for n countries and n firms if n > 2.
104
the complete holding for banks and therefore on the relocation of a bank’s
headquarters and on regulation and locational competition with respect to
individual production plants of international industrial firms. In order to
emphasize the universal validity of my model, let us discuss two specific
situations of two concrete firms in the following example.
 
                                                                                        C1
        HQ    Branch 2 Production 1
 C1 Branch 1  HQ
    
   C2
  HQ Branch 3 Production 1
  
  Production 2
       C2
Figure 1. Two different and arbitrary examples of a firm relocating its
headquarters (HQ) or one branch of production, respectively, from country C1 to
country C2.
Example 1 In the left panel of figure 1, I illustrate the case of a bank head-
quartered in C1 which manages, for instance, two branches in C1 and a third
branch in C2. Hence, C1 is the bank’s home country. I assume that C1 begins
regulating the banking sector and imposes, for instance, mandatory deposit
insurance upon resident corporate groups. Thus, I assume that the considered
regulation is targeted on the entire holding and not directly on branches. Sup-
pose that C2 intends to attract foreign firms and abandons strong regulatory
measures. As indicated by the arrow in figure 1, it is worth displacing the
headquarters from C1 to C2 for the shareholders of the bank. Then, the bank
is able to evade regulation since C2 becomes the new home country.
The right panel of figure 1 depicts the (arbitrary) situation of an industrial
enterprise headquartered in C1. Suppose that it operates one production plant
(say 1) in C1 and one (say 2) in C2. If we assume that concerns about healthy
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working conditions lead to more expensive equipment and higher worker’s
compensation in C1 compared to C2, the firm may profit from relocating pro-
duction plant 1 from C1 to C2. In this example, location of the headquarters
is not relevant and my focus is on production plant 1. Hence, C2 is the new
home country and regulatory authority of production plant 1 after relocation.
Production plant 2 is not important because it is already located in C2.
Mobility of the firms induces locational competition. Since firms act interna-
tionally and produce for global markets, competition between enterprises is
not affected by relocation and is therefore extraneous to my model. Firms’
profits are calledW and are assumed to be taxed in the home country. Double
tax treaties combined with transfer pricing may legitimate this assumption
even if one defines W as the profit of the entire corporate group.4 Home
countries benefit from the labor demand of their firms, which I incorporate
into the model via the gain L. Taxes are denoted by 0 < t < 1. There exists
an optimal regulatory policy which reduces firm’s profit by R∗ if established
and which imposes the cost R∗ to the home country of the firm otherwise.
I do not determine the concrete regulatory measures.5 However, examples
of R∗ are - on the firm side - the costs of environmental constraints which
truncate the earnings of the firm or the liability insurance premium for a
systemic relevant bank. On the state side, R∗ then describes the expected
costs of ecological damage induced by the firm or the expected costs of the
bailout of the insolvent bank. The regulatory policy is optimal since the
regulator (= government of the home country) charges exactly the costs R∗
4For instance, firm fi’s headquarters (holding) reside in a tax-favored area, the sub-
sidiary is located in another country. Then, double tax treaties ensure that profits are
taxed only once. Moreover, the holding is able to transfer profits of a subsidiary to the
holding via intra-firm trading and these profits are then subject to the weaker taxation
laws. For example, the subsidiary buys expensive products or resources of the holding.
5In my investigation, it is adequate to assume existence of an optimal regulatory pol-
icy. Hahn and Stavins (1992) list fundamental objectives when establishing the appropri-
ate regulatory measure, for example, efficiency, ease of implementation, monitoring and
enforcement capability, clarity to the general public. They discuss different policy instru-
ments for environmental protection and differentiate between ‘market-based’ (pollutant
emission taxes or tradable emission permits) and ‘command-and-control’ (performance
and technology standards) approaches. These approaches are empirically compared by
Jaffe and Stavins (1995). However, the concrete implementation of the regulation is not
crucial for the moment in my context.
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to the firm’s account which arise as side effect of firm’s business operations.
Here, optimality of the regulatory policy reflects the polluter-pays-principle.
Because - on the firm side - R∗ characterizes either the costs of restrictions
in the economic activity which emerge as losses in profits or deposit insur-
ance premiums, it is assumed to be tax deductible (for instance, as operating
expense). R∗ is exogenous since the impact of regulation on profit, produc-
tion or labor is not generally clear and needs additional assumptions. The
direct costs of regulation are investigated in this section. In addition to the
direct costs, it is not always true that tighter regulation also reduces prof-
its fundamentally or leads to downsizing of production. For example, banks
may even gain trust and confidence through credible regulation or industrial
enterprises may establish a clean image when complying with environmental
rules. Hence, regulation can serve as a signal of quality. However, I endog-
enize R∗ in section 4 - at the expense of generality. In my model, countries
can decide whether they want to implement optimal regulation or no regu-
lation. The two countries have the same basic parameter values, but may
differ in the action. The same is true for the two firms which can either stay
or relocate. To sum up, firms have to pay taxes in and are regulated by the
home country in my setup. W, L, R∗ and T denote present values, i.e., I
incorporate the expected discounted future costs and benefits.
I assume that a firm’s profit is greater than the costs of regulation, i.e.,
W > R∗. Otherwise, a regulated firm will not start operations.6 I assume
that firms are able to pay the costs of regulation and the transaction costs:
W − R∗ − T > 0. Additionally, I suppose that transaction costs are smaller
than the costs of optimal regulation, i.e., R∗ > T. This assumption is based
on the fact that the considered headquarters or relevant parts are usually
small and easily relocated, but often also have to guarantee for environmen-
6I am aware of the fact that some firms may violate this assumption under a strict
polluter-pays-regime: depending on the risk assessment, a supposable example are the
immense costs of liability insurance for operating companies of nuclear power plants. If
R∗ is very large compared to the other parameters, my model predicts that to regulate
is the strictly dominant strategy for the countries. Thus, these firms would have to close
down. In my model, the economic survival of such firms may only be explained by highly
increased lobbying.
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tal damage or collapses of subsidiaries.
My goal is to investigate the regulation of the firms in a sequential game.
Without lobbying, countries want to maximize their payoff which is com-
posed of L, R∗ and t according to the number of firms headquartered in
their states and according to the regulatory policy. They can anticipate the
behavior of the firms and therefore control their own payoffs by imposing
either optimal or no regulation. The objective of the firms is to maximize
their profits by either displacing or staying given the regulation of the two
countries. A firm’s profit function consists of W, R∗ and t. In accordance
with Calzolari and Loranth (2010), lobbying means that the regulator is con-
cerned with firms’ profits. Thus, if the firms are allowed to lobby, countries
maximize the own payoffs and the profits of the firms.7
Example 2 Let us calculate the profit functions of the countries and relevant
parts of the firms in example 1. In both cases, I assume that C1 regulates and
C2 does not. Therefore, the bank relocates its headquarters and the industrial
enterprise relocates its production plant 1 from C1 to C2. As aforementioned,
I focus on costs of regulation, labor demand, transaction costs, profits and
taxes of the bank’s headquarters and the industrial enterprise’s production
plant 1 and ignore other branches, other production plants et cetera of the
same firms. If the headquarters and the production plant stayed in C1, both
firms’ profit functions would be equal to
(1− t)(W −R∗).
But, they want to gain more and relocate. The respective payoffs for both
firms are
(1− t)(W − T ).
Since C1 regulates and therefore loses the headquarters of the bank or the
7I concentrate on the outcome of lobbying, i.e., on the better information or bias of the
policy makers, and not on the appropriate action, i.e., for instance, in-house or external
lobbying. In order to identify the suitable means or adequate costs of lobbying, see, for
example, Hill et al. (2011). Instead of assuming that governments maximize their own
and firms’ profits fifty-fifty under lobbying, it is also possible to use another quota.
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production plant 1, its payoff function is zero. The profit function of country
C2 increases by
L−R∗ + t(W − T )
for each recently arrived firm. This example illustrates that countries have to
anticipate the behavior of the firms when choosing utility-maximizing regula-
tory measures. I incorporate this procedure in the following sequential game.
Figure 2 depicts the extensive form of the sequential game. I use the termi-
nology of Mas-Colell et al. (1995). In the first step, countries decide about
the regulatory policy anticipating the decision of the firms about the location
of their headquarters or relevant parts in the second step. Hence, I solve the
game via backward induction. The simultaneous move subgames of the firms
given the regulation of the countries yield the Nash equilibria for the firms
which are plotted in bold lines. Then, I am able to solve the simultaneous
move reduced game for the countries with or without lobbying. Hence, for
the complete game, I obtain subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). The
circle around decision nodes indicates an information set with more than one
node and means that the decision maker does not know about the prece-
dent decision. It reflects the simultaneous move with the preceding player,
i.e., the imperfect information. Let us use the following conventions: if both
countries regulate, this case is called ‘global regulation’; if both countries do
not regulate, I call the situation ‘no regulation’; all other cases are ‘country-
specific regulations’. To simplify matters, I call the actions of the reduced
game or of the complete game sometimes SPNE although I am aware of the
fact that SPNE is actually defined as a profile of strategies.8
8For instance, ‘no regulation’ turns out to be the SPNE of the sequential game with
lobbying in proposition 1. Sometimes I write ddss or only dd. I mean the strategy profile
(σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4) where σ1 = d, σ2 = d,
σ3 =

s , if rr
d , if rd
s , if dr
s , if dd
and σ4 =

s , if rr
s , if rd
d , if dr
s , if dd
.
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     C1
regulate (r) do not (d)
first step:
     C2 C decide
r   d r    d
    f1     f1      f1     f1
stay  do not
  (s)     (d)           s     d            s     d            s      d second
step:
    f2      f2     f2     f2 f decide
s d s d s d s d s  d s d s d  s  d
global regulation      country-specific regulation    no regulation
Figure 2. Extensive form of the sequential game for regulation of the two firms
f1 and f2 by the countries C1 and C2. Bold lines indicate the Nash equilibria of
the simultaneous move subgames of the firms given regulatory policies of the
countries.
Proposition 1 provides the equilibrium results of the sequential game. The
proof is given in the appendix.
Proposition 1 Solutions of the sequential game for regulation of multina-
tionals (without tax competition):
1. Without lobbying:
(a) If L+t(W−R∗) ≥ 2(L−R∗+tW )−tT, i.e., if it is more profitable
for the country to accomodate one firm with regulation than two
firms without regulation, global regulation is SPNE.
(b) If L − R∗ + tW ≥ 0, i.e., if the costs of bearing the firm without
regulation can be paid with the benefits from labor demand and
taxes, no regulation is SPNE.
(c) Best outcome for countries’ aggregate benefit is global regulation.
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2. With lobbying:
(a) No regulation is unique SPNE.
(b) No regulation is the strictly dominant strategy of the countries.
3. Country-specific regulation is not optimal for countries.
Proposition 1 states that the status quo including lobbying, locational com-
petition and mainly country-specific regulation is not optimal and leads to
the no regulation equilibrium. I find that the aggregate utility function of
both countries (addition of both payoff functions) is maximized under global
regulation. Hence, in order to establish optimal regulation in a credible way,
the model suggests to suppress lobbying and to agree to global rules. Note
that the use of the polluter-pays-principle in order to determine the optimum
regulatory scheme in my model avoids overregulation under global regulation.
In the previous model setup, countries choose from two regulatory measures:
optimal regulation R∗ or no regulation. It is also possible for the countries
to impose ‘minimum’ regulation R instead of no regulation. Minimum reg-
ulation means R + T < R∗, i.e., it is worth for firms to relocate if the home
country optimally regulates and the other country only imposes minimum
regulation. Suppose that countries choose from optimum and minimum reg-
ulation in a modification of the previous game. Mutatis mutandis, the results
of proposition 1 remain the same with respect to minimum instead of no reg-
ulation. This can easily be seen by adapting the proof of proposition 1.
However, as long as one country offers the no regulation policy, minimum
regulation has to fulfill an additional constraint: R < T, i.e., it is worth for
firms to stay if the home country minimally regulates and the other country
imposes no regulation. Since I consider present values and the more or less
non-recurring transaction costs T are presumably very small compared to the
expected sum of all discounted future regulatory costs, the term minimum
regulation indeed characterizes very low regulatory requirements. Moreover,
I use the example of no regulation instead of minimum regulation since in a
setup with more than two countries, locational competition in order to at-
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tract foreign firms is likely to diminish minimum regulation. Nevertheless, it
is important to note that today’s existence of a variety of regulatory measures
in many countries all over the world does not contradict my model, but may
be explained and limited upwards by transaction costs.
3 Regulation versus locational competition (in-
clusive of tax competition) and lobbying
In this section, I include tax competition between the two countries C1 and
C2. In contrast to the last section, countries choose from two different tax
rates. My focus is on the narrow section of corporate taxes with respect
to multinational enterprises. My work cannot contribute to the question of
optimal taxation because the all-embracing taxation scheme of the entire
economy is not clear or requires very strong assumptions as described in the
following paragraph.
Many taxation principles are discussed in the economic literature and im-
plemented all over the world. Optimal taxation theory investigates efficiency
and minimizes the excess burden or deadweight loss of taxation, i.e., the
economic loss induced by the changing behavior of people or firms because
of the tax. It is minimized under lump-sum taxes. Nevertheless, this is a
regressive taxation and therefore violates the idea of equity in welfare eco-
nomics.9 Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) investigate the direct-cum-indirect tax
problem and find that income taxes are the optimal solution. Cremer et al.
(2001) contradict these results by allowing for other sources of heterogeneity,
like wealth, besides earnings. Canegrati (2007) uses a probabilistic voting
model and states that powerful interest groups may prevent a substantial
shift from mildly regressive indirect to progressive direct taxation since the
implementation of such reforms may become a key to lose or win elections
for self-interested governments. Hence, appropriate taxation depends on ef-
9It is obvious that the methods used to measure equity (for instance, Lorenz curves or
Gini coefficients of personal or disposable incomes or wealth-based Gini coefficients) and
the objectives in this regard are crucial and may suggest different taxation schemes.
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ficiency analysis, but also on political discussions and calculations and on
social norms. Furthermore, taxes are levied to generate revenue, but also to
redistribute and to address externalities via repricing. Additionally, tax cuts
are often part of fiscal policy in order to stimulate demand and investment
behavior. It is known that tax cuts for wealthy and trickle-down arguments
are controversial, since they do not directly target those with less income, and
that they have led to many debates about their actual impact on economic
stimulus. Moreover, all these fiscal measures require accurate differentiation
of short-term and long-term effects. Furthermore, the Barro-Ricardo equiva-
lence theorem states that financing of government spending with either debt
or tax increase does not matter. Its validity has been doubted, inter alia,
because future tax increase is not the only instrument for debt retirement.
Possible ways are also expenditure cuts or monetizing the debt.
The interdependence of all the different goals, effects and interests makes
the topic of optimal taxation very involved and many subtleties occur. For
instance, Be´nabou and Ok (1998) discuss the ‘prospect of upward mobility’
hypothesis with regard to private motives in voting procedures about tax
laws.
I discuss taxation for two reasons: first, it enables me to make a more com-
plete investigation when dropping the assumption of fixed taxes. Second, it
accentuates an analogy of tax competition with my main topic regulation.
The same vicious circle as in the tax dumping case takes place in an inter-
national deregulation competition: as a consequence of missing regulations
or lacking tax harmonization, the costs of ecological damage caused by in-
dustrial firms, the bailout of insolvent systemic relevant banks or the loss
induced by missing taxes may be imposed on the commonality. As in propo-
sition 1 with respect to regulation, the much-debated ‘race to the bottom’
may also impend with respect to taxation. I explain this mechanism in the
next paragraph.
Tax reductions in country A may induce an efficient allocation of the yield
of A because of scarcity or may even augment the short-term revenues by at-
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tracting headquarters or subsidiary companies of powerful enterprises which
transfer profits to the tax-favoured country A for account of other countries.
However, in the long run, the other countries may have to respond to the
outflow of capital and, without harmonization, all governments may have to
reduce taxes. Drastic tax cuts below the level which permits the realization
of essential public services and projects lead to social cuts or increased taxes
for the immobile citizens, if these tax cuts are forced as a necessary reaction
to locational competition and cannot be offset by the attraction of new in-
vestors. Thus, the possibility to set taxes independently of other scopes of
application under country-specific taxation is confronted with the zugzwang
induced by locational competition. This reasoning generates the results of
this section. Although I analyze the current situation without comprehensive
harmonization and my work reveals some drawbacks of lacking harmoniza-
tion in a specific model setup, it is obvious that a potential harmonization
may also induce problems. Hence, it is not the intention of the paper to
approve inefficient allocation of taxes or the arbitrary international dictation
of tax rates without democratic legitimation.
I only consider two exogenous tax rates and ignore the broad macroeco-
nomic interrelations for the following reason. If governments compete with
other countries and cut corporate taxes in order to attract foreign firms, it is
unlikely that these tax losses force savings with respect to locational advan-
tages. Governments are able to reduce corporate taxes on the cost of other
taxes, of equitable redistribution, via increased national debt or via cuts in
public services, which do not affect locational competition, not least because
today’s savings on the cost of these items may cause their negative exter-
nalities, such as inequality, insolvency or lack of innovation, only after years
have passed. Hence, governments have the possibility to win locational com-
petition in settling foreign companies at the expense of other sectors. This
allows to carry out my analysis of corporate taxes under locational compe-
tition separately from the entire fiscal policy. Nevertheless, note that my
model correctly incorporates governments’ gains and costs of low taxes via
attraction of foreign firms and tax deficits in countries’ utility functions.
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The model setup and the sequential game remain the same as before ex-
cept the following modifications. Countries do not only decide about the
regulatory policy, they also select the taxation. Countries choose from two
tax policies: high tax rate t (for instance, ‘adequate taxes to sufficiently
finance projects of the community’) and low tax rate s (for instance, ‘compe-
tition taxes in order to allure enterprises’) where 0 < s < t < 1. In order to
allow for tax dumping, I assume that (1− s)(W −R∗ − T ) > (1− t)W. This
condition implies that the country with low tax rate attracts the firms of the
country with high tax rate.10 Instead of choosing r (regulate) or d (do not
regulate) in figure 2, countries select rh (regulate, high tax rate), rl (regulate,
low tax rate), dh (do not regulate, high tax rate) or dl (do not regulate, low
tax rate). Thus, we obtain sixteen subgames for the firms instead of four.
The equilibrium results of the sequential game are stated in proposition 2,
the proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 2 Solutions of the sequential game for regulation of multina-
tionals (including tax competition):
1. Without lobbying:
(a) If L+ t(W −R∗) ≥ 2(L−R∗ + tW )− tT,
L+ t(W −R∗) ≥ 2(L+ s(W −R∗))− sT and
L + t(W − R∗) ≥ 2(L − R∗ + sW ) − sT, global regulation with
overall high taxes is SPNE.
(b) If L+ s(W − R∗) ≥ 2(L− R∗ + sW )− sT, global regulation with
overall low taxes is SPNE.
(c) If L−R∗ + tW ≥ 0,
L−R∗ + tW ≥ 2(L+ s(W −R∗))− sT and
L− R∗ + tW ≥ 2(L− R∗ + sW )− sT, no regulation with overall
high taxes is SPNE.
(d) If L − R∗ + sW ≥ 0, i.e., if the costs of bearing the firm without
10See tables 16 - 23 in the appendix.
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regulation can be paid with the benefits from labor demand and
taxes, no regulation with overall low taxes is SPNE.
(e) Best outcome for countries’ aggregate benefit is global regulation
with overall high taxes.
2. With lobbying:
(a) No regulation with overall low taxes is unique SPNE.
(b) No regulation and low taxation is the weakly dominant strategy of
the countries.
3. Country-specific regulation and country-specific taxation are not opti-
mal for countries.
The results of proposition 2 are similar to the ones of proposition 1. The sta-
tus quo including country-specific taxation policies, the possibility of multina-
tionals to relocate their headquarters or relevant parts, lobbying and different
regulations across countries leads to no regulation and low taxes. Although
the alliance of the countries achieves its maximum payoff under global regu-
lation with overall adequate taxes, locational competition and lobbying cause
the opposite policy.
It is interesting that the outcome no regulation and low taxes is not al-
ways a SPNE in the case without lobbying. As formulated in the condition
of proposition 2, 1 (d), the reason is that a multinational can be a burden for
a country and it may not be wise to retain the firm. However, the countries
want to attract such firms in the game when we allow for lobbying.
4 Banking regulation
After having explored the additional impact of tax competition on the se-
quential game in the last section, we now return to the basic model of sec-
tion 2 and discuss the endogenization of regulation in the concrete example
of multinational banks. Banks are different than other industrial firms in
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many respects. Freixas and Rochet (2008) list the main categories which
classify the functions banks perform in the contemporary banking theory:
offering liquidity and payment services, transforming assets, managing risks,
processing information and monitoring borrowers. Among other essential
characteristics such as the fact that banks’ creditors are simultaneously their
customers, the authors also highlight banks’ fragility because of their illiquid
assets and liquid liabilities. With respect to regulation, Freixas and Rochet
identify the following three characteristics of banks which emphasize their
particular situation, hazard and importance for the entire economy. First,
banks solve an asymmetric information problem or a market imperfection:
they know the creditworthiness of their borrowers by putting large efforts
into screening and monitoring. Second, financial fragility may cause conta-
gion via bank runs. Third, it may be politically inacceptable to leave the cost
of default to small depositors. To these specifics is affiliated the discussion
about systemic relevant and ‘too big to fail’ banks. A survey of these issues
and the hereby induced implicit state guarantee for large and interconnected
banks can be found in Ha¨feli and Ju¨ttner (2011).
4.1 Assumptions and model setup
In section 2, I make the following two assumptions, which I loosen in this
section:
1. The optimal costs of regulation imposed on multinationals are equal to
the expected or incurred losses of the commonality if no regulation is
established.
2. Besides subtraction of the direct regulatory costs from firms’ profits,
regulation has no fundamental impact on business activities and profit
functions of the firms.
I replace these two items with new assumptions:
1. It is conceivable that the optimal regulatory costs imposed on multi-
nationals are lower than the costs of the expected or incurred losses
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of the commonality if no or minimum regulation is established. Rea-
sons may be the cost differences of preventive measures and ex post
bailouts. Hence, I assume that two costs exist: R∗C for the countries,
if no or minimum regulation is imposed on the firms, and R∗f for the
firms otherwise.
2. If firms are regulated by the home country, not only direct regulatory
costs matter. To optimize profits minus regulatory costs, firms adapt
their business models B which influence profits. The implemented reg-
ulatory policy restricts the set of possible business models. I call this
set SBM = {B : B feasible under regulatory policy}. Furthermore, I
assume that the optimal regulation may depend on the business model.
Thus, firms’ profits and optimal regulation itself are functions of the
business model. Additionally, I suppose that profits are also a function
of optimal regulation. For instance, strong regulation restores trust
and confidence of banks and may reduce refinancing costs and increase
profits.
3. I equate managers with shareholders, i.e., I assume that managers act
in the spirit of shareholders and are owners of the firm.11 Therefore,
banks maximize the expected return on equity (ROE) instead of the
expected earnings as considered before.12 Hence, firms under regulation
choose the optimal business model such that
(1− t)(W (B,R∗f (B))−R∗f (B))
E
is maximized. E denotes capital and W (B,R∗f (B)) − R∗f (B) is the
11I ignore conflicts between managers and shareholders such as empire building,
perquisites derived from overinvestment and the disciplinary effect of debt via reduction
of free cash flow.
12In corporate finance, firms often maximize the value of the firm. This approach is not
appropriate in my setup since I equate managers with shareholders and want to determine
their preferred levels of debt and equity.
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pre-tax income. I.e.,
max
B∈SBM
(1− t)(W (B,R∗f (B))−R∗f (B))
E
.
Let Bd denote the business model which is observed under the ex ante
(= minimal initial standards) regulatory policy (SBM minimally re-
stricted and R∗f (Bd) = 0) and
Br = argmaxB∈SBM
(1− t)(W (B,R∗f (B))−R∗f (B))
E
the business model under full regulation. Note that this representation
of the ROE is based on the simplified model of section 2. Later on in
this section, I provide a more accurate definition of the ROE for banks.
4. Governments’ gains from labor L and transaction costs T depend on
the business models of the firms:
L = L(B) and T = T (B).
However, for simplicity, I assume that L 6= L(B) and T 6= T (B).
In order to specify the concrete functional forms of business model, reg-
ulation and return on equity, I restrict my general model of section 2 to
multinational banks. I consider the banks f1 and f2 headquartered in C1 and
C2, respectively, as described in example 1. The size of a bank’s total assets
is normalized to one. I assume that the home country regulates the entire
holding. Banks’ business models are assumed to be
B = (σ, I,D)
where σ ∈ {σL, σH} denotes the risk of the illiquid asset fraction and I and
D are the fractions of illiquid asset and debt financing, respectively, of the
unit asset of the bank. Hence, the fraction of liquid asset is 1− I and equity
is E = 1−D. σL denotes low risk and σH high risk. I suppose that the risk
is observable. Thus, banks determine the risk of their illiquid asset fractions,
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their levels of illiquidity and their capital structures.
Capital structure theory indicates many tradeoffs and conflicts between debt
and equity financing. Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) suggest the opti-
mal amount of debt under consideration of tax shields via deductible interest
payments and bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs include legal and admin-
istrative costs. However, with respect to banks, one also has to account for
the loss of the charter value. It is the value of a bank’s capacity to continue
operations in the future. Suarez (1994) finds that closure rules are an impor-
tant regulatory measure since the charter value of a bank has an impact on
risk-taking: the potential losing of the charter value if the regulator obtains
the right to take over the distressed bank may preserve the bankers’ disci-
pline. Miller (1977) argues that the corporate tax savings from debt are offset
by debtholders’ demand for higher pretax returns because of their potential
personal tax disadvantage compared to equityholders. Nevertheless, Graham
(2003) finds cross-sectional regression evidence that high tax rate firms use
debt more intensively than low tax rate firms. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
discuss the agency costs with respect to corporate financing. Agency costs
consist of three components: monitoring and bonding costs which are paid
in order to reduce the residual loss. The latter are opportunity costs induced
by the following issues.
• Debt overhang or underinvestment: Myers (1977) explains that firms
financed with risky debt (and especially in combination with growth
options) may reject projects with a positive net present value (NPV).
This implies that issuing debt leads to a suboptimal investment strat-
egy and therefore reduces the present market value of the firm. For
example, Williams-Stanton (1998) finds empirical evidence for these
predictions in the banking sector.
• Asset substitution: Equity has the same payoff function depending on
the leveraged firm value as a European Call option with exercise price
equal to the face value of the debt. Therefore, shareholders prefer
higher variation of the asset returns, i.e., riskier projects. If firms first
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issue debt promising to take low variation projects and second choose
the risky ones, they transfer value from debtholders to shareholders.
The issue is discussed in Jensen and Meckling (1976).
• Free cash flow: If one assumes manager-shareholder conflicts and free
cash flow is not paid back to investors, it may induce incentives for
management to benefit from perks. Increased debt with its required
interest payments can serve as a disciplinary measure. This issue is
discussed, for example, in Stulz (1990).
• Claim dilution: It occurs if firms borrow more on the same assets.
• Dividend payouts: The value of debt decreases if dividends are paid
out.
Besides the above-mentioned trade-off theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) and
Myers (1984) suggest the pecking order theory which states that companies
prefer to use first internal funds, then debt and finally equity as a last resort
because of asymmetric information. Sufficient cash or liquid assets enable
firms to undertake good investment opportunities without issuing expensive
debt or underpriced equity because of information costs. For instance, in-
vestors which are less informed than firm insiders may assume that equity is
only issued when stock is overvalued and will require a lower price. However,
Frank and Goyal (2002) find no evidence for the pecking order theory. An-
other approach to capital structure theory is analyzed by Shleifer and Vishny
(1992). The authors explain that firms, which have to liquidate assets in or-
der to meet debt payments, may have to sell them to industry outsiders
since the other firms in the same industry are themselves likely to be in
similar troubles. Thus, the liquidated assets are underpriced in industry- or
economy-wide recessions. Illiquidity turns out to be a cost of leverage and liq-
uid assets are assumed to have a higher debt capacity. Admati et al. (2010)
conclude that equity is not socially and possibly not even privately expensive
for banks. Today’s high return on equity compensates shareholders for their
risk induced by the large proportion of debt financing and since equity is gen-
erally riskier than debt. Additionally, public tax policies usually subsidize
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debt financing, which may not be appropriate under the perspectives of social
costs. The authors also emphasize that high leverage increases systemic risk.
There exist additional problems such as adjustment costs when rebalancing
capital structure in a dynamic framework, see for instance Strebulaev (2004),
or conflicts between debtholders of different seniorities. Table 1 summarizes
which of the above-mentioned hypotheses impose costs or provide benefits,
respectively, for banks if the fraction of debt financing is increased.
Costs of debt Benefits of debt
Bankruptcy costs Tax shields
Loss of charter value Free cash flow
Debt overhang Pecking order theory
Illiquidity
Systemic risk
Table 1. Hypotheses on capital structure which generate costs and
benefits, respectively, for banks (firm value) if leverage is increased. Asset
substitution harms debtholders, but may benefit shareholders.
Hence, I am aware of the complexity of optimal capital structure. However,
it is not possible to include all conflicts in my banking model since I have to
decide whether I assume owner-managers who maximize the return on equity
or managers who are concerned about total firm value. The hypotheses are
also debatable and their impacts are often difficult to quantify. I incorporate
shareholders’ preference for risky projects in my model and let firms choose
debt and equity levels, but also asset liquidity and risk, which maximize the
return on equity. Thus, it is not the goal of my model to provide a bank’s
optimal leverage ratio, but to compute the preferred business models of man-
agers to optimize the return on equity. The tax advantages of debt have no
influence on the resulting debt level since managers do not maximize firm
value in my setup. The not considered hypotheses consistent with return on
equity maximizing managers could be included in an extension of my frame-
work.
I assume that the riskless rate is normalized to zero and that the riskiness
σ of the illiquid loan portfolio I influences the dispersion of the return RI ,
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but that the expected return remains constant in accordance with Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970):
Eσ[RI(σ)] ≡ ν,
with ν > 1 and Eσ[c(RI(σ))] increases with σ for any increasing convex
function c. Eσ denotes the expectation conditional on the implemented risk
σ. In my model, depositors cannot invest directly in the illiquid assets. Hence,
I incorporate the need for financial intermediation. Since σ is observable, the
interest payments RD(σ) − 1 on debt are depending on the risk-taking σ.
Note that RD is a deterministic function of σ, whereas RI(σL) and RI(σH)
are random variables contingent on the future states of nature.13 Figure 3
depicts a bank’s balance sheet. Liquid assets contain cash reserves including
money on the account at the central bank and money lent in the interbank
market and stock, bonds, funds traded on the stock exchange.
Assets Liabilities
Fraction of Debt
liquid assets D
1-I
(Return RD(σ))
Fraction of
illiquid assets
I
(Risk  σ) Equity
(Return  RI(σ)) E=1-D
Figure 3. Balance sheet of a bank with one unit of assets.
I consider a one-period model as illustrated in figure 4: at time t = 0
(present), the players’ decisions, i.e., the sequential game, take place and
banks choose their optimal business models. At time t = 1 (future), the
profits of the illiquid assets are recognized, debtholders’ principal has to be
13It is clear that RD(σ) and the parameters DI(σ) and IP (σ), introduced later on,
are also functions of I or even D, respectively. I indicate only the dependence on σ for
simplicity and in order to emphasize the influence of the illiquid assets’ riskiness.
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returned and interest payments or deposit insurance premiums have to be
paid. Additionally, taxes are levied and countries pay the potential costs of
missing regulations.
t=0 t=1
Sequential game; Illiquid asset return is
banks choose recognized; face value
optimal business of debt, interest
models payments or deposit
insurance premiums
are paid; tax collection;
potential bailout
Figure 4. Timeline.
As in the chapter about the industrial organization approach of banking in
Freixas and Rochet (2008), it is possible to use a cost function which refers
to the cost of managing a volume D of deposits and a volume I of loans
according to the notion of a bank’s production function introduced by Sealey
and Lindley (1977). For simplicity, I ignore these costs.
4.2 Regulatory policies
Let us assume that there exists already ex ante regulation:
• Capital ratio: E > k > 0.
• Liquidity requirements: I ≤ q < 1.
I select two additional regulatory policies and discuss the differences of the
two approaches. Besides the ex ante rules q and k which are imposed on
banks in both countries in any case, I consider deposit insurance on the
one hand and higher capital requirements and stronger liquidity measures
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on the other hand. I mean deposit insurance for the entire debt. Only the
depositors or lenders to the bank are bailed out in case of a default, but
not the shareholders who decide about the risk policy of the institution. It
may serve, for example, as a regulation for ’too big to fail’ banks which then
would have to pay for the state guarantee for debt accordingly to the size
of their liabilities and their risk exposures. A way to calculate the adequate
insurance premiums is the option pricing approach used by Lucas and Mc-
Donald (2006, 2009). The insurance premium incorporates the riskiness of
the bank. An extensive discussion of this approach can be found in Ha¨feli
and Ju¨ttner (2011). This deposit insurance can solve the market discipline
issue induced by the implicit guarantee for systemic relevant banks since they
will not be rescued in threatening situations. Deposits will be similar to safe
bonds supported by the government, which reduces contagion effects within
the financial system. Two drawbacks of the deposit insurance approach are
moral hazard when banks have paid their premiums and the procyclicality of
the premiums: low values during unstressed situations and high values during
crisis times may not allow the insurer to accumulate sufficient reserves for the
potential depositor bailout. Under deposit insurance, the bank has to pay
only the riskless rate (zero in the model) as interest payment to debtholders.
Regarding the second additional regulatory policy in my model, stronger cap-
ital requirements improve a bank’s solvency and stricter liquidity standards
avoid losses induced by forced sales of illiquid assets into falling markets be-
cause of industry-wide recession and excess supply. I.e., if firms do not have
to liquidate during crisis periods, a downward spiral of illiquid asset prices
may be circumvented. However, both measures cannot prevent, in contrast
to full deposit insurance, the necessity of bailouts of systemic relevant banks
by the governments if the capital buffer melts down, for instance, after price
shocks on the asset side. Therefore, it is not an optimal regulation in the
sense of section 2 since the home country has to pay for externalities caused
by banks. To sum up, I consider the following two regulatory schemes in
addition to the ex ante regulation:
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• Regulatory policy 1: full deposit insurance. Governments protect debt,
banks pay the insurance premium DI(σ) depending on the risk of the
fraction of the illiquid asset. I assume that the insurance premium
compensates the country exactly for the expected losses.
• Regulatory policy 2: tighter rules. Regulating countries impose higher
capital requirements kˆ > k and stronger liquidity measures qˆ < q.
Although the expected bailout costs are reduced compared to the ex
ante regulation q and k, the country has still to bear some costs R∗C(B),
depending on the bank’s business model, because of the implicit state
guarantee for ’too big to fail’ banks.
4.3 Systemic relevance
I assume the banks to be systemic relevant such that they enjoy an implicit
state guarantee as long as governments do not impose the explicit guarantee
of regulatory policy 1 on them. I call the guarantee implicit if there does
not exist a contract between bank and guarantor although there are reasons
to assume that a guarantee exists. Therefore, the intervention is uncertain
and the implementation is not specified. This definition of an implicit guar-
antee is identical to the one stated and extensively explained in Ha¨feli and
Ju¨ttner (2011). In my model, a bailout under regulatory policy 1 means the
rescue of debtholders, i.e., the one-time enforcement of deposit insurance by
the government when a bank defaults. The term ‘systemic relevant’ implies
in my model that the government will rescue the debtholders or the entire
bank with a certain probability. Therefore, governments have to take into
account the costs of a bailout in their payoff functions if they do not suffi-
ciently regulate. However, debtholders still require a (reduced) risk premium
from banks in this case since the state guarantee is not explicit via contract
and therefore uncertain for them. Under ex ante regulation and regulatory
policy 2, the guarantee is implicit and therefore not quantifiable. If all mar-
ket participants knew that a potential bailout only concerned the rescue of
the debtholders, the expected costs of missing regulation for the countries
would be in the range of the expected loss of debtholders’ principal. How-
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ever, I cannot make this assumption since shareholders are also often rescued.
For banks which are not systemic relevant, it suggests itself to assume that
D + DI(σ) = RD(σ)D if there is no deposit insurance imposed on the right
hand side of the equation, i.e., the risk premium which is paid to debtholders
of banks without state guarantee is equal to the insurance premium under
regulatory policy 1. However, the banks in my example are systemic relevant.
Therefore, banks enjoying an implicit guarantee (ex ante regulation and reg-
ulatory policy 2) profit by reduced refinancing costs. I define the debt returns
induced by favorable refinancing conditions because of an implicit guarantee
R−D(σ) via (R
−
D(σ)D−D) = AR · (RD(σ)D−D), where AR ∈ [0, 1) indicates
the advantage of refinancing. For instance, Baker and McArthur (2009) in-
vestigate the spread between the average cost of funds for small banks and
the cost of funds for systemic relevant institutions with assets in excess of
100 bn USD and find that the gap widened in the period from the fourth
quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2009. However, it is not pos-
sible to determine a general number for AR since it depends on the market
perception of systemic relevance of the bank, the ability or willingness of the
country to afford a bailout or the type of expected bailout. If I assume a refi-
nancing advantage parameter of AR, this means that banks have to pay only
the fraction AR of the fair interest payments which are to be paid without
implicit guarantee. In this case, the expected bailout costs for the country
R∗C are also reduced since it will intervene only with a reduced probability.
4.4 Maximization of the ROE
Next, I provide the formulae for banks’ maximization of the return on equity
for the different policies. The lower bounds for debt financing, SσL , and
illiquid assets, 1− SσH , are explained later on. Not yet included are positive
effects of credible regulation on a bank’s ROE as a result of increased trust
and confidence since this gain is difficult to quantify.
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• Ex ante regulation:
max
B∈SBM
ROE(B, ν, T, AR) =
{
(1−t)(Eσ [max((1−I)+RI(σ)I−T−R−D(σ)D,0)]−E)
E
, if positive
Eσ [max((1−I)+RI(σ)I−T−R−D(σ)D,0)]−E
E
, if negative
where SBM = {σL, σH} × [1− SσH , q]× (SσL , 1− k].
• Regulatory policy 1 (deposit insurance):
max
B∈SBM
ROE(B, ν, T ) =
{
(1−t)(Eσ [max((1−I)+RI(σ)I−T−DI(σ)−D,0)]−E)
E
, if positive
Eσ [max((1−I)+RI(σ)I−T−DI(σ)−D,0)]−E
E
, if negative
where SBM = {σL, σH} × [1− SσH , q]× (SσL , 1− k].
• Regulatory policy 2 (tighter rules):
max
B∈SBM
ROE(B, ν, T, AR) =
{
(1−t)(Eσ [max((1−I)+RI(σ)I−T−R−D(σ)D,0)]−E)
E
, if positive
Eσ [max((1−I)+RI(σ)I−T−R−D(σ)D,0)]−E
E
, if negative
where SBM = {σL, σH} × [1− SσH , qˆ]× (SσL , 1− kˆ].
Note that the transaction costs T only occur if the bank relocates.
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Figure 5. Probability density functions of the returns on total assets (liquid and
illiquid loan portfolio) with respect to high and low risk exposures.
Figure 5 depicts the different situations for the two risk exposures: high risk
means a greater dispersion and low risk less variation of the returns on the
illiquid asset fraction. I assume uniformly distributed total asset returns
across [Sσ, (1− I) + Iν + ((1− I) + Iν − Sσ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=2((1−I)+Iν)−Sσ
] with mean (1− I) + Iν, i.e.,
(1− I) +RI(σ)I ∼ U [Sσ, 2((1− I) + Iν)− Sσ].
I use the uniform distribution since potential gains and losses are usually
bounded. At least the losses of the illiquid assets cannot exceed the initial
investment. Therefore, I assume that Sσ ≥ 1−I. Sσ depends on the riskiness
of the illiquid assets and is lower for higher risk: SσH < SσL . To discuss the
realistic case of risky debt, I assume that Sσ < D. The probability density
function reads as follows:
fσ(x) =
{
1
2((1−I)+Iν−Sσ) , x ∈ [Sσ, 2((1− I) + Iν)− Sσ]
0 , otherwise
.
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The expected loss of debtholders’ principal Eσ[LP ] depends on the imple-
mented risk σ and is defined in the following equation:
Eσ[LP ] =
∫ D
Sσ
(D − x)fσ(x)dx =
1
2
(D − Sσ)2
2((1− I) + Iν − Sσ) .
We obtain the minimum interest payment on debt IP (σ), due at the time
t = 1, which ensures that depositors participate, if we solve the following
equation for IP (σ) :∫ ∞
D
min(x−D, IP (σ))fσ(x)dx = Eσ[LP ].
This is equivalent to∫ D+IP (σ)
D
(x−D)fσ(x)dx+
∫ 2((1−I)+Iν)−Sσ
D+IP (σ)
IP (σ)fσ(x)dx = Eσ[LP ].
I.e., the expected interest payment is equal to the expected loss of the prin-
cipal. We find that
1
2
IP (σ)2 + IP (σ)(2(1− I + Iν)− Sσ −D − IP (σ)) = 1
2
(D − Sσ)2,
i.e.,
IP (σ)+,− = 2(1− I + Iν)−D − Sσ ± 2
√
1− I + Iν −D
√
1− I + Iν − Sσ.
Since IP (σ)+ > IP (σ)− =
(√
1− I + Iν − Sσ −
√
1− I + Iν −D)2 > 0, I
define
IP (σ) := IP (σ)−.
I set
RD(σ) = 1 +
IP (σ)
D
for not systemic relevant banks. For systemic relevant banks, we get:
R−D(σ) = 1 +
AR · IP (σ)
D
.
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Optimality of regulatory policy 1 implies DI(σ) = IP (σ), i.e., the expected
insurance premium is equal to the expected loss of debtholders’ principal.
Note that
Eσ[max((1− I) +RI(σ)I − T −R−D(σ)D, 0)] =∫ ∞
D+T+AR·IP (σ)
(x−D − T − AR · IP (σ))fσ(x)dx =
1
2((1− I) + Iν − Sσ) ·
∫ 2((1−I)+Iν)−Sσ
D+T+AR·IP (σ)
(x−D − T − AR · IP (σ))dx
and
Eσ[max((1− I) +RI(σ)I − T −DI(σ)−D, 0)] =∫ ∞
D+T+IP (σ)
(x−D − T − IP (σ))fσ(x)dx =
1
2((1− I) + Iν − Sσ) ·
∫ 2((1−I)+Iν)−Sσ
D+T+IP (σ)
(x−D − T − IP (σ))dx.
I can now rewrite the formulae of the ROEs as easily computable closed-form
solutions:
• Ex ante regulation and regulatory policy 2:
ROE(σ, I,D, ν, T, AR) =
1−t
1−D
(
1
2
((2((1−I)+Iν)−Sσ)−(D+T+AR·IP (σ)))2
2((1−I)+Iν−Sσ) − (1−D)
)
,
if positive
1
1−D
(
1
2
((2((1−I)+Iν)−Sσ)−(D+T+AR·IP (σ)))2
2((1−I)+Iν−Sσ) − (1−D)
)
,
if negative
• Regulatory policy 1:
ROE(σ, I,D, ν, T ) =
1−t
1−D
(
1
2
((2((1−I)+Iν)−Sσ)−(D+T+IP (σ)))2
2((1−I)+Iν−Sσ) − (1−D)
)
,
if positive
1
1−D
(
1
2
((2((1−I)+Iν)−Sσ)−(D+T+IP (σ)))2
2((1−I)+Iν−Sσ) − (1−D)
)
,
if negative
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Again, note that the transaction costs T only occur if the bank relocates.
As in the previous sections, the one-time costs T can be assumed to be very
small compared to the other parameters which represent present values of
actually recurring large costs in the future.14 Let us assume that D+T < 1.
Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that the difference between realistic
expected total asset returns and debt fraction is smaller than one, i.e., 1−I+
Iν − D < 1. The maximization of the ROE yields the following theoretical
results. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 3 When banks maximize their ROEs under the above-mentioned
conditions, We find the following implications for their optimizing business
models.
1. Statutory deposit insurance can have a disciplinary effect on risk-taking
if banks do not relocate. In this case, banks are risk-neutral and there-
fore indifferent to the riskiness of the illiquid assets. In all other cases,
banks are risk-loving.
2. Under all three regulatory policies, banks increase their debt fraction as
much as possible.
3. Under all three regulatory policies, banks increase their illiquid asset
fraction as much as possible.
The third result of proposition 3 holds since illiquid assets promise higher
returns than liquid ones and this effect dominates the effect of dependence
of interest payments and deposit insurance premiums on the illiquid asset
fraction. The first and second results are also plausible from an economical
perspective: increasing the riskiness of illiquid assets again induces a trade-
off between higher profits because of asset substitution and higher returns on
debt or larger deposit insurance premiums. Under regulatory policy 1, the
effect of high deposit insurance premiums exactly offsets the other one if the
bank faces no transaction costs. In all other cases, the manager-shareholders
become risk-loving because of the dominating characteristc of equity which
14In my model, the future is contracted to the single point in time t = 1.
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resembles a call option on bank’s asset value. Increasing debt induces a trade-
off between the fact that we have to divide by a smaller factor 1 −D when
computing the ROE and higher returns on debt or larger deposit insurance
premiums. The latter effect is dominated by the former one.
The formulae of the ROEs show that tighter rules may reduce the ROE
drastically although they do not resolve the problem of the implicit guaran-
tee. Regulation via deposit insurance implements an explicit guarantee and
the ROE only decreases by the lost refinancing advantage. This is a con-
sequence of the polluter-pays-principle under deposit insurance: banks are
free to choose their preferred debt and illiquidity levels, but they have to pay
appropriately for their risks. On the other hand, tighter rules impose direct
restrictions on a bank’s business model and may substantially narrow the set
of ROE-maximizing debt and illiquidity levels. However, it is also important
to note that the reduced ROE under regulatory policy 2 accompanies equi-
tyholders’ lower default risk because of the decreased leverage and reduced
amount of risky assets. In other words, the higher ROE under regulatory
policy 1 also compensates shareholders for higher risk. Hence, it is mislead-
ing to compare only the ROEs under the different regulatory policies without
considering the specific risks (default risk, liquidity risk et cetera).
4.5 Sequential game including multinational banks
In the following, I integrate my example of multinational banks into the se-
quential game of section 2. Let us define the terms for countries’ costs of miss-
ing regulation R∗C(Bd), partial regulation R
∗
C(Br2) or country-
disburdening regulation R∗C(Br1). Bri denotes the bank’s business model un-
der regulatory policy i. Note that R∗C(Br1) = 0 since the deposit insurance
premium fully compensates the country for the explicit guarantee. The costs
of incomplete regulation for the countries R∗C(Bd) and R
∗
C(Br2) might incor-
porate potential increases because of ex post bailouts and thereby already
induced large harmful externalities instead of using possibly favorable pre-
ventative measures. Optimization of the ROE yields the maximizing risk
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level σ, maximizing illiquid asset fraction I and maximizing fraction of debt
financing D. Since the manager-shareholders’ objective function is the ROE,
it is the appropriate measure for the subgame of the firms. However, for the
reduced game of the countries which focuses on the total amount of corporate
taxes, we have to consider a bank’s pre-tax income (PTI):
• Ex ante regulation and regulatory policy 2:
PTI(σ, I,D, ν, T, AR) =
1
2
((2((1− I) + Iν)− Sσ)− (D + T + AR · IP (σ)))2
2((1− I) + Iν − Sσ) − (1−D)
where σ, I, D ∈ Bd or Br2, respectively.
• Regulatory policy 1:
PTI(σ, I,D, ν, T ) =
1
2
((2((1− I) + Iν)− Sσ)− (D + T + IP (σ)))2
2((1− I) + Iν − Sσ) − (1−D)
where σ, I, D ∈ Br1.
I use the following notation: subscript s and subscript d indicate the ROE
or the PTI if the bank stays (s) or relocates (d), respectively. The upper
indices d, r1 and r2 denote the regulatory policy of the (new) home country:
ex ante, 1 or 2, respectively. Since the parameters ν, T and AR are assumed
to remain the same for the entire game, I sometimes omit these arguments.
Let us adopt and rewrite the basic assumptions of section 2. We are interested
in banks which start operations, i.e., which expect a positve net present value
of future profits, and which are able to pay the transaction and regulatory
costs under both regulatory policies. The assumption R∗ > T of section 2 is
transferred to
ROEdd(Bd) > ROE
r1
s (Br1)
and
ROEdd(Bd) > ROE
r2
s (Br2).
134
Thus, T needs to be sufficiently small. Using the formula of the ROE and
the previous assumptions, we obtain:
ROEds(Bd) > ROE
d
d(Bd) > ROE
r1
s (Br1) > ROE
r1
d (Br1) > 0,
ROEds(Bd) > ROE
d
d(Bd) > ROE
r2
s (Br2) > ROE
r2
d (Br2) > 0.
I exploit the same assumptions for the PTI:
PTIds(Bd) > PTI
d
d(Bd) > PTI
r1
s (Br1) > PTI
r1
d (Br1) > 0,
PTIds(Bd) > PTI
d
d(Bd) > PTI
r2
s (Br2) > PTI
r2
d (Br2) > 0.
The assumption W −R∗ − T > 0 of section 2 can be translated to
PTIdd(Bd)−R∗C(Bd) > 0.
Proposition 4 lists the results of the game. For the game including regulatory
policy 1, the outcome is similar to the one in section 2. If L+ PTIr1s (Br1) <
2L− 2R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd) + PTIdd(Bd), i.e., if it is more profitable to attract
two banks under ex ante regulation than one bank under regulatory policy 1,
the outcome is identical to the result of section 2. Note that this condition
is likely to be fulfilled under realistic parameters: it is reasonable to suppose
that the pre-tax income of a bank under regulatory policy 1 is similar to the
pre-tax income of an ex ante regulated bank minus government’s expected
costs for a bailout of this bank. Otherwise, global regulation may also be a
SPNE when governments are allowed to lobby. Country-specific regulation
is still not an equilibrium and minimum regulation remains a SPNE. For
regulatory policy 2, the results are also similar, but we have to bear in mind
that it is only a partial regulation in the sense that governments still offer
an implicit guarantee to systemic relevant banks. Therefore, countries incur
some costs even under regulation. The proof of proposition 4 is analogous to
the one of proposition 1. The tables which contain all possible payoffs of the
banks and countries are given in the appendix.
Proposition 4 Solutions of the sequential game for regulation of multina-
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tional banks:
I) Regulation = regulatory policy 1 (deposit insurance)
1. Without lobbying:
(a) If L + tPTIr1s (Br1) ≥ 2L − 2R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd) + tPTIdd(Bd),
i.e., if it is more profitable for the country to accomodate one firm
under regulatory policy 1 than two firms under ex ante regulation,
global regulation is SPNE.
(b) If L − R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd) ≥ 0, i.e., if the costs of bearing the
firm under ex ante regulation can be paid with the benefits from
labor demand and taxes, ex ante regulation is SPNE.
(c) If tPTIr1s (Br1) ≥ −R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd), the best outcome for
countries’ aggregate benefit is global regulation.
2. With lobbying:
(a) If L + PTIr1s (Br1) < 2L − 2R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd) + PTIdd(Bd), ex
ante regulation is unique SPNE.
(b) If L + PTIr1s (Br1) < 2L − 2R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd) + PTIdd(Bd), ex
ante regulation is the strictly dominant strategy of the countries.
3. Country-specific regulation is not optimal for countries.
II) Regulation = regulatory policy 2 (tighter rules)
1. Without lobbying:
(a) If L + tPTIr2s (Br2) − R∗C(Br2) ≥ 2L − 2R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd) +
tPTIdd(Bd), i.e., if it is more profitable for the country to accomo-
date one firm under regulatory policy 2 than two firms under ex
ante regulation, global regulation is SPNE.
(b) If L − R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd) ≥ 0, i.e., if the costs of bearing the
firm under ex ante regulation can be paid with the benefits from
labor demand and taxes, ex ante regulation is SPNE.
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(c) If tPTIr2s (Br2)−R∗C(Br2) ≥ tPTIds(Bd)−R∗C(Bd), the best outcome
for countries’ aggregate benefit is global regulation.
2. With lobbying:
(a) If L + PTIr2s (Br2) − R∗C(Br2) < 2L − 2R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd) +
PTIdd(Bd), ex ante regulation is unique SPNE.
(b) If L + PTIr2s (Br2) − R∗C(Br2) < 2L − 2R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd) +
PTIdd(Bd), ex ante regulation is the strictly dominant strategy of
the countries.
3. Country-specific regulation is not optimal for countries.
III) Comparison of the two regulatory policies
1. If corporate taxes t are sufficiently low, we obtain
L+ tPTIr1s (Br1) > L+ tPTI
r2
s (Br2)−R∗C(Br2),
i.e., regulatory policy 1 yields the greater outcome than regulatory policy
2 for both countries under global regulation and without lobbying.
The last item of proposition 4 states that under sufficiently low corporate
taxes, countries’ outcome (without lobbying) under global regulation includ-
ing deposit insurance is greater than under tighter capital rules and liquidity
measures. The reason is again that deposit insurance disburdens countries
from the implicit state guarantee and reduces banks’ profits only by the lost
refinancing advantages whereas tighter liquidity and financing rules may re-
duce banks’ risk exposures and profits on the one hand, but do not resolve the
problem of government bailout on the other hand. The conditions of propo-
sition 4, III), are likely to be fulfilled if we recall that in reality, the concrete
implementation of the implicit guarantee is uncertain and the value of an im-
plicit guarantee may be greater than the expected loss of debtholders’ princi-
pal. However, the two regulatory policies pursue different (above-mentioned)
goals which make them difficult to compare. Combinations of both are estab-
lished around the world and regulators often elaborate regulatory packages
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which should address several issues: for instance, disengagement of govern-
ment from rescuing financially distressed banks, protection of debtholders
(in order to avoid spillover effects onto the real economy) and reduction of
banks’ risk exposures (in order to stabilize the banking system and to prevent
contagion).
5 Conclusions
Governments have to simultaneously retain and regulate multinational en-
terprises with outside options: the firms can relocate their headquarters,
subsidiaries or branches to countries with relaxed rules. The conflict is ob-
vious, locational competition can prevent the enforcement of optimal regula-
tion. Lobbying may additionally undercut governments’ power of imposing
the necessary rules. Hence, missing international cooperation may enable
multinationals to play states against each other and may lead to deregula-
tion competition. This paper analyzes this situation in a sequential game
between countries and firms.
I find that no regulation is the strictly dominant strategy of the countries
and the unique SPNE when I allow for lobbying. However, the best outcome
for countries’ aggregate benefit is global regulation. Hence, country-specifc
regulation is not optimal for countries in my setup. I also implement tax
competition. The unique SPNE is no regulation with overall low taxes and
this represents also the weakly dominant strategy of the countries.
I apply the game to the concrete example of banking regulation via deposit
insurance and via tighter capital and liquidity rules, respectively. First, I can
regain my results with regard to general multinational firms similarly also for
banks. Second, the model points out the following important differences of
the two regulatory policies for banks. Statutory deposit insurance abolishes
the implicit state guarantee of systemic relevant banks and decreases banks’
profits by the loss of favorable refinancing costs. More severe capital stan-
dards and liquidity measures reduce, but do not solve the problem of the
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government bailout. Furthermore, they directly restrict banks’ business ac-
tivities, which also decreases banks’ profits. I identify situations for which
deposit insurance induces higher payoffs for the countries under global reg-
ulation. Additionally, deposit insurance proves to have a disciplinary effect
on banks’ risk-taking.
Finally, let me shortly embed my theoretical results and their implications
into the real-world situation. My work emphasizes the importance of global
regulation. In other words, the globalization of markets and the global nature
of multinational corporations may require a regulatory globalization. The
notions of global governance and multilateralism are already well-established
and many organizations such as the United Nations, WTO, World Bank,
IMF, OECD or the European Union address issues involving more than one
state. Environmental problems such as the global warming motivated multi-
lateral agreements as the Kyoto Protocol. Besides these prominent examples,
we observe a sort of global administrative law, for instance, via control of
fishing, arms control, standardization or antitrust law. However, although
needed, the concept of global regulation contains some serious immanent dif-
ficulties and some drawbacks due to today’s implementation. First of all,
enormous efforts in all respects are necessary to install and enforce transna-
tional regulatory schemes. Furthermore, many civil society groups or de-
veloping countries critize the limited membership to a few nations of many
multilateral organizations. The fact that these few nations are also often
the home states of powerful multinational firms leads to an additional dis-
tortion: bias of the regulators. Moreover, it is frequently almost impossible
for negotiating governments to reach a consensus on subjects which conflict
with their own interests. Furthermore, many international conventions are
only of recommendatory and non-binding nature and depend on governments
which are often not able or willing to enforce them. Additionally, global
rules determined by international committees may dilute the voting weights
of individual citizens and therefore compromise the credibility of democratic
decision making.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Tables 2 - 5 provide the firms’ profits for the four
subgames including the decisions of the firms. The underlined actions are
the Nash equilibria which are illustrated as bold lines in figure 2. I use the
four-digit code C1C2f1f2 for the actions (r=regulate, s=stay, d=do not) of
the complete game and the two-digit code C1C2 for the actions (r=regulate,
d=do not) of the reduced game of the countries. Strictly speaking, the two-
digit code is an abbreviation of the four-digit code motivated by the backward
induction. For instance, dd means ddss. The abuse of notation is for the ease
of simplicity and the terms are clear from the context.
rrss rrsd rrds rrdd
f1 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
f2 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
Table 2. Subgame ‘firms’, global regulation. Firms’ profits for some possible
actions (four-digit code: C1C2f1f2, r=regulate, s=stay, d=do not). The
underlined actions indicate the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move
subgame of the firms given the regulatory policies of the countries.
rdss rdsd rdds rddd
f1 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − T ) (1− t)(W − T )
f2 (1− t)W (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)W (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
Table 3. Subgame ‘firms’, country-specific regulation.
drss drsd drds drdd
f1 (1− t)W (1− t)W (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
f2 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − T )
Table 4. Subgame ‘firms’, country-specific regulation.
ddss ddsd ddds dddd
f1 (1− t)W (1− t)W (1− t)(W − T ) (1− t)(W − T )
f2 (1− t)W (1− t)(W − T ) (1− t)W (1− t)(W − T )
Table 5. Subgame ‘firms’, no regulation.
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In tables 6 and 7, we find the payoffs of the countries in the reduced game
including the decisions of the countries. Table 6 provides the results without
lobbying and in the game of table 7, firms are allowed to lobby, i.e., countries
worry about the own payoffs and the profits of the firms.
rr rd
C1 L + t(W − R∗) 0
C2 L + t(W − R∗) 2(L− R∗ + tW )− tT
dr dd
C1 2(L− R∗ + tW )− tT L− R∗ + tW
C2 0 L− R∗ + tW
Table 6. Reduced game ‘countries’, without lobbying. Countries’ payoffs for
some possible actions (two-digit code: C1C2, r=regulate, d=do not). The
underlined actions indicate the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (under the
parameter conditions of proposition 1) rrss and ddss of the complete game.
rr rd
C1 L +W − R∗ 0
C2 L +W − R∗ 2(L− R∗ +W )− T
dr dd
C1 2(L− R∗ +W )− T L− R∗ +W
C2 0 L− R∗ +W
Table 7. Reduced game ‘countries’, with lobbying. Countries’ payoffs for some
possible actions (two-digit code: C1C2, r=regulate, d=do not). The underlined
actions indicate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ddss of the complete game.
Let us prove the items of proposition 1 (the following statements are obvious
by means of the previous tables):
1 (a): If L+ t(W −R∗) ≥ 2(L−R∗ + tW )− tT, C1 and C2 will not deviate
from r when rr is established. For example, C1 receives L+ t(W −R∗) under
rr whereas it gets 2(L−R∗+ tW )− tT under dr. Hence, global regulation is
a SPNE under the above condition.
1 (b): If L − R∗ + tW ≥ 0, C1 and C2 receive greater payoffs without
regulation (dd) than with unilateral deviation: C1 gets 0 under rd and C2
gets 0 under dr. Thus, no regulation is a SPNE under the above condition.
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1 (c): Add the payoffs of C1 and C2 in table 6 for the different cases rr,
rd, dr and dd. Global regulation yields the maximum payoff.
2 (a): Because it is never worth to deviate for a country from dd, no regula-
tion is a SPNE. For all other outcomes, there is at least one country which
benefits from a change of the regulatory policy.
2 (b): C1 obtains a better payoff for dr than for rr and for dd than for
rd. C2 obtains a better payoff for rd than for rr and for dd than for dr.
3: First, let us consider the case without lobbying. If L−R∗+tW ≥ 0, dd is a
SPNE. If L−R∗+tW < 0, we get L+t(W−R∗) ≥ 2(L−R∗+tW )−tT, since
L+ t(W −R∗) is always positive by assumption. Then, rr is a SPNE. Thus,
we always obtain at least one SPNE. rd and dr cannot be SPNE because it
is worth to deviate for one country to rr or dd according to the situation.
Second, with lobbying: it is always worth to deviate for the country which
regulates from dr or rd to dd. Hence, country-specific regulation is not op-
timal in the sense that it is not an equilibrium and therefore not stable and
in the sense that the aggregate utility function of both countries (addition of
both payoff functions) is always greater in the case of global regulation.

Proof of Proposition 2. In tables 8 - 23 I present the profits of the
firms for the subgames including the decisions of the firms. The under-
lined actions are the Nash equilibria which will be used for the reduced
game of the countries in tables 24 and 25. I exploit the six-digit code
C1(regulation)C1(tax)C2(regulation)C2(tax)f1f2 for the actions (r=regulate,
h=high tax rate, l=low tax rate, s=stay, d=do not) of the complete game
and the four-digit code C1(regulation)C1(tax)C2(regulation)C2(tax) for the
actions (r=regulate, h=high tax rate, l=low tax rate, d=do not) of the re-
duced game of the countries. Again, the use of abbreviated versions will be
clear in the context.
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rhrhss rhrhsd rhrhds rhrhdd
f1 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
f2 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
Table 8. Subgame ‘firms’, global regulation, high taxes. Firms’ profits for some
possible actions (six-digit code: C1C1C2C2f1f2, r=regulate, h=high tax rate,
l=low tax rate, s=stay, d=do not). The underlined actions indicate the Nash
equilibrium of the simultaneous move subgame of the firms given the regulation
and tax policies of the countries.
rhdhss rhdhsd rhdhds rhdhdd
f1 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − T ) (1− t)(W − T )
f2 (1− t)W (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)W (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
Table 9. Subgame ‘firms’, country-specific regulation, high taxes.
dhrhss dhrhsd dhrhds dhrhdd
f1 (1− t)W (1− t)W (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
f2 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − T )
Table 10. Subgame ‘firms’, country-specific regulation, high taxes.
dhdhss dhdhsd dhdhds dhdhdd
f1 (1− t)W (1− t)W (1− t)(W − T ) (1− t)(W − T )
f2 (1− t)W (1− t)(W − T ) (1− t)W (1− t)(W − T )
Table 11. Subgame ‘firms’, no regulation, high taxes.
rlrlss rlrlsd rlrlds rlrldd
f1 (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− s)(W − R∗ − T )
f2 (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − R∗ − T )
Table 12. Subgame ‘firms’, global regulation, low taxes.
rldlss rldlsd rldlds rldldd
f1 (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − T ) (1− s)(W − T )
f2 (1− s)W (1− s)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− s)W (1− s)(W − R∗ − T )
Table 13. Subgame ‘firms’, country-specific regulation, low taxes.
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dlrlss dlrlsd dlrlds dlrldd
f1 (1− s)W (1− s)W (1− s)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− s)(W − R∗ − T )
f2 (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − T ) (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − T )
Table 14. Subgame ‘firms’, country-specific regulation, low taxes.
dldlss dldlsd dldlds dldldd
f1 (1− s)W (1− s)W (1− s)(W − T ) (1− s)(W − T )
f2 (1− s)W (1− s)(W − T ) (1− s)W (1− s)(W − T )
Table 15. Subgame ‘firms’, no regulation, low taxes.
rhrlss rhrlsd rhrlds rhrldd
f1 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− s)(W − R∗ − T )
f2 (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
Table 16. Subgame ‘firms’, global regulation, mixed taxes.
rhdlss rhdlsd rhdlds rhdldd
f1 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − T ) (1− s)(W − T )
f2 (1− s)W (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− s)W (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
Table 17. Subgame ‘firms’, country-specific regulation, mixed taxes.
dhrlss dhrlsd dhrlds dhrldd
f1 (1− t)W (1− t)W (1− s)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− s)(W − R∗ − T )
f2 (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − T ) (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − T )
Table 18. Subgame ‘firms’, country-specific regulation, mixed taxes.
dhdlss dhdlsd dhdlds dhdldd
f1 (1− t)W (1− t)W (1− s)(W − T ) (1− s)(W − T )
f2 (1− s)W (1− t)(W − T ) (1− s)W (1− t)(W − T )
Table 19. Subgame ‘firms’, no regulation, mixed taxes.
rlrhss rlrhsd rlrhds rlrhdd
f1 (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
f2 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − R∗ − T )
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Table 20. Subgame ‘firms’, global regulation, mixed taxes.
rldhss rldhsd rldhds rldhdd
f1 (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − R∗) (1− t)(W − T ) (1− t)(W − T )
f2 (1− t)W (1− s)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)W (1− s)(W − R∗ − T )
Table 21. Subgame ‘firms’, country-specific regulation, mixed taxes.
dlrhss dlrhsd dlrhds dlrhdd
f1 (1− s)W (1− s)W (1− t)(W − R∗ − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗ − T )
f2 (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − T ) (1− t)(W − R∗) (1− s)(W − T )
Table 22. Subgame ‘firms’, country-specific regulation, mixed taxes.
dldhss dldhsd dldhds dldhdd
f1 (1− s)W (1− s)W (1− t)(W − T ) (1− t)(W − T )
f2 (1− t)W (1− s)(W − T ) (1− t)W (1− s)(W − T )
Table 23. Subgame ‘firms’, no regulation, mixed taxes.
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In the following, I prove the items of proposition 2 by means of the previous
tables:
1 (a)-(d): The results can be checked with table 24: if the conditions of
the proposition hold, the suggested outcomes rhrh, rlrl, dhdh, dldl are SPNE
because no country has an incentive to deviate from the respective action.
(All other outcomes (country-specific regulation or country-specific taxation)
cannot be SPNE since - for all parameters - there always exists a country
which deviates.)
1 (e): This result is obvious if one adds the payoffs of C1 and C2 in ta-
ble 24.
2 (a): Because it is never worth to deviate for a country from dldl, no reg-
ulation combined with overall low taxes is a SPNE. For all other outcomes,
there is at least one country which benefits from a change of the regulatory
policy.
2 (b): Table 25 shows that dl weakly dominates every other strategy, i.e., for
every other strategy xy, the payoff of one country induced by dl is greater
than or equal to the payoff induced by xy for all strategies of the other coun-
try and with strict inequality for some strategies of the other country.
3: Country-specific regulation or country-specific taxation is not optimal in
the sense that it is not an equilibrium and therefore not stable (it is always
worth to deviate for one country) and in the sense that the aggregate utility
function of both countries is greater in the case of global regulation.

Note that - mutatis mutandis - the results remain the same for n countries
and n firms if n > 2. The reason is that in the subgames of the firms when we
assume global or no regulation (or global regulation and high taxes, global
regulation and low taxes, no regulation and high taxes or no regulation and
low taxes), multinationals stay in the current home country because of the
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transaction costs. Thus, in the reduced game of the countries including lob-
bying, governments always receive the same payoffs in these cases. However,
in all other cases, there exists at least one country which regulates and ob-
tains a zero payoff. Thus, country-specific regulation cannot be a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium, et cetera.
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that the ROE is optimal if banks maxi-
mize the following expression:
g(σ, I,D) :=
1
1−D ·((
(1−AR)(2(1− I + Iν)−D − Sσ)− T + 2AR
√
1− I + Iν −D√1− I + Iν − Sσ
)2
4((1− I) + Iν − Sσ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:f(σ,I,D)
.
This formula is valid for the ex ante regulation and regulatory policy 2, if
AR ∈ (0, 1), and for regulatory policy 1, if AR = 1. Recall that (1−I)+Iν >
1 > D > Sσ and that T is very small.
1: We obtain:
∂f
∂Sσ
(σ, I,D) =(
(1−AR)(2(1− I + Iν)−D − Sσ)− T + 2AR
√
1− I + Iν −D√1− I + Iν − Sσ
)
4(1− I + Iν − Sσ)2 ·
(2
(
−(1−AR)−AR
√
1− I + Iν −D√
1− I + Iν − Sσ
)
(1− I + Iν − Sσ)+(
(1−AR)(2(1− I + Iν)−D − Sσ)− T + 2AR
√
1− I + Iν −D
√
1− I + Iν − Sσ
)
) =(
(1−AR)(2(1− I + Iν)−D − Sσ)− T + 2AR
√
1− I + Iν −D√1− I + Iν − Sσ
)
4(1− I + Iν − Sσ)2 ·
((1−AR)(Sσ −D)− T ).
Thus, we get ∂f
∂Sσ
= 0 if T = 0 and AR = 1, and ∂f
∂Sσ
< 0 otherwise.
2: We obtain:
∂g
∂D
(σ, I,D) =(
(1−AR)(2(1− I + Iν)−D − Sσ)− T + 2AR
√
1− I + Iν −D√1− I + Iν − Sσ
)
(1−D)24(1− I + Iν − Sσ) ·
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(−2(1−AR)(1−D)− 2AR
√
1− I + Iν − Sσ√
1− I + Iν −D (1−D)+(
(1−AR)(2(1− I + Iν)−D − Sσ)− T + 2AR
√
1− I + Iν −D
√
1− I + Iν − Sσ
)
).
It is obvious that 2(1−AR)(1−D) < (1−AR)(2(1− I + Iν)−D−Sσ) and
2AR
√
1−I+Iν−Sσ√
1−I+Iν−D (1 − D) < 2AR
√
1− I + Iν −D√1− I + Iν − Sσ. There-
fore, ∂g
∂D
> 0.
3: We obtain:
∂f
∂I
(σ, I,D) =(
(1−AR)(2(1− I + Iν)−D − Sσ)− T + 2AR
√
1− I + Iν −D√1− I + Iν − Sσ
)
(ν − 1)−14(1− I + Iν − Sσ)2 ·
((4(1−AR) + 2AR
(√
1− I + Iν − Sσ√
1− I + Iν −D +
√
1− I + Iν −D√
1− I + Iν − Sσ
)
)(1− I + Iν − Sσ)−(
(1−AR)(2(1− I + Iν)−D − Sσ)− T + 2AR
√
1− I + Iν −D
√
1− I + Iν − Sσ
)
).
Since 4(1− AR)(1− I + Iν − Sσ) > (1− AR)(2(1− I + Iν)−D − Sσ), we
get ∂f
∂I
> 0.

Proof of Proposition 4. Tables 26 - 29 provide the banks’ ROEs for the
four subgames including the decisions of the banks. The underlined actions
are the Nash equilibria. I use the four-digit code C1C2f1f2 for the actions
(r=regulate, s=stay, d=do not/ex ante regulation) of the complete game and
the two-digit code C1C2 for the actions (r=regulate, d=ex ante regulation) of
the reduced game of the countries. ri, i ∈ {1, 2}, denotes regulatory policy i.
Hence, tables 26 - 29 are valid for both regulatory policies: deposit insurance
and tighter rules.
rrss rrsd rrds rrdd
f1 ROE
ri
s (Bri) ROE
ri
s (Bri) ROE
ri
d (Bri) ROE
ri
d (Bri)
f2 ROE
ri
s (Bri) ROE
ri
d (Bri) ROE
ri
s (Bri) ROE
ri
d (Bri)
Table 26. Subgame ‘banks’, global regulation. Banks’ ROEs for some possible
actions (four-digit code: C1C2f1f2, r=regulate, s=stay, d=do not/ex ante
regulation). The underlined actions indicate the Nash equilibrium of the
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simultaneous move subgame of the banks given the regulatory policies of the
countries.
rdss rdsd rdds rddd
f1 ROE
ri
s (Bri) ROE
ri
s (Bri) ROE
d
d(Bd) ROE
d
d(Bd)
f2 ROE
d
s(Bd) ROE
ri
d (Bri) ROE
d
s(Bd) ROE
ri
d (Bri)
Table 27. Subgame ‘banks’, country-specific regulation.
drss drsd drds drdd
f1 ROE
d
s(Bd) ROE
d
s(Bd) ROE
ri
d (Bri) ROE
ri
d (Bri)
f2 ROE
ri
s (Bri) ROE
d
d(Bd) ROE
ri
s (Bri) ROE
d
d(Bd)
Table 28. Subgame ‘banks’, country-specific regulation.
ddss ddsd ddds dddd
f1 ROE
d
s(Bd) ROE
d
s(Bd) ROE
d
d(Bd) ROE
d
d(Bd)
f2 ROE
d
s(Bd) ROE
d
d(Bd) ROE
d
s(Bd) ROE
d
d(Bd)
Table 29. Subgame ‘banks’, ex ante regulation.
In tables 30 and 31, I provide the payoffs of the countries in the reduced game
including the decisions of the countries. Here, regulation means regulatory
policy 1: deposit insurance. Table 30 gives the results without lobbying and
in the game of table 31, banks are allowed to lobby, i.e., countries worry
about the own payoffs and the profits of the banks.
rr rd
C1 L + tPTI
r1
s (Br1) 0
C2 L + tPTI
r1
s (Br1) 2L− 2R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd) + tPTIdd(Bd)
dr dd
C1 2L− 2R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd) + tPTIdd(Bd) L− R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd)
C2 0 L− R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd)
Table 30. Reduced game ‘countries’, without lobbying. Countries’ payoffs for
some possible actions (two-digit code: C1C2, r=regulate, d=ex ante regulation).
The underlined actions indicate the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (under the
parameter conditions of proposition 4) rrss and ddss of the complete game.
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rr rd
C1 L + PTI
r1
s (Br1) 0
C2 L + PTI
r1
s (Br1) 2L− 2R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd) + PTIdd(Bd)
dr dd
C1 2L− 2R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd) + PTIdd(Bd) L− R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd)
C2 0 L− R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd)
Table 31. Reduced game ‘countries’, with lobbying. Countries’ payoffs for some
possible actions (two-digit code: C1C2, r=regulate, d=ex ante regulation). The
underlined actions indicate the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (under the
parameter conditions of proposition 4) rrss and ddss of the complete game.
In tables 32 and 33, I provide the payoffs of the countries in the reduced game
including the decisions of the countries. Here, regulation means regulatory
policy 2: tighter rules. Table 32 gives the results without lobbying and in
the game of table 33, banks are allowed to lobby, i.e., countries worry about
the own payoffs and the profits of the banks.
rr rd
C1 L + tPTI
r2
s (Br2)− R∗C(Br2) 0
C2 L + tPTI
r2
s (Br2)− R∗C(Br2) 2L− 2R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd) + tPTIdd(Bd)
dr dd
C1 2L− 2R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd) + tPTIdd(Bd) L− R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd)
C2 0 L− R∗C(Bd) + tPTIds(Bd)
Table 32. Reduced game ‘countries’, without lobbying. Countries’ payoffs for
some possible actions (two-digit code: C1C2, r=regulate, d=ex ante regulation).
The underlined actions indicate the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (under the
parameter conditions of proposition 4) rrss and ddss of the complete game.
rr rd
C1 L + PTI
r2
s (Br2)− R∗C(Br2) 0
C2 L + PTI
r2
s (Br2)− R∗C(Br2) 2L− 2R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd) + PTIdd(Bd)
dr dd
C1 2L− 2R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd) + PTIdd(Bd) L− R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd)
C2 0 L− R∗C(Bd) + PTIds(Bd)
Table 33. Reduced game ‘countries’, with lobbying. Countries’ payoffs for some
possible actions (two-digit code: C1C2, r=regulate, d=ex ante regulation). The
underlined actions indicate the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (under the
parameter conditions of proposition 4) rrss and ddss of the complete game.
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The proof of proposition 4, I and II, is analogous to the one of proposition
1. Item III follows from the comparison of tables 30 and 32.

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